

PLANO DE ENSINO

Disciplina: FIL 136 – Reasoning and Belief

Horário: quarta-feira, 18h-22h

Créditos: 04

Semestre: 2019/2

Docente(s): David Horst

Súmula Análise dos trabalhos recentes sobre a normatividade epistêmica. A disciplina vai ser em inglês (mas a avaliação pode ser feita em português).

Objetivo In this class, we will read and discuss recent work on issues surrounding reasoning and belief. A special focus will be on the following questions: what is the nature of reasoning? Does reasoning require a “taking condition”? What is basing one’s beliefs on reasons? Do we have some form of control over our beliefs? Can we define reasons in terms of reasoning? Is reasoning a sort of competence or ability?

Conteúdo Programático

The program is subject to changes!

Week 1-6: Reasoning

Paul Boghossian, “What is Inference?”

John Broome, *Rationality Through Reasoning* (selections)

Ulf Hlobil, “Inferring by Attaching Force”

Colin McHugh/Johnathan Way, “What is Reasoning?”

David Horst, “How Reasoning Aims at Truth”

Nishi Shah, “Why We Reason the Way We Do”

Week 7-10: Reasoning, Reasons, and Basing

Ram Neta, “The Basing Relation”

Joseph Raz, *From Normativity to Responsibility* (selections)

Douglas Lavin, “Problems of Intellectualism”

Matthew Silverstein, “Reducing Reasons”

Jonathan Way, “Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning”

Week 11-12: Epistemic Agency

Matthew Boyle, “Making Up Our Mind and the Activity of Reason”

Pamela Hieronymi, “Responsibility and Reflection”

Guy Rohrbaugh, “Inner Achievement”

Week 13-15: Epistemic Rationality

Thomas Kelly, “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique”

Selim Berker, “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions”

Susanna Rinard, “No Exception for Belief”

Week 16-19: Epistemic Competence, Belief, and Reasoning

Ernest Sosa, *Judgment and Agency* (selections)

Andrea Kern, *Sources of Knowledge* (selections)

David Horst, “Against Skill Epistemology”

Método de Trabalho Aulas expositivas; leitura conjunta e discussão da bibliografia. A aula vai ser ministrada em INGLÊS (mas o trabalho escrito pode ser feito também em português).

Método de Avaliação O conceito final será determinado a partir dos seguintes critérios: participação em aula e trabalho escrito.

Bibliografia

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- Boyle, M. 2011, “Making Up Our Mind and the Activity of Reason”, *Philosopher’s Imprint*, 11 (17): 1-24.
- Broome, J. 2013: *Rationality Through Reasoning*, Wiley Blackwell.
- Hlobil, U. 2018, “Inferring by Attaching Force”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*.
- Horst, D. Forthcoming, “How Reasoning Aims at Truth”, *Noûs*.
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- Hieronimi, P. 2014, “Responsibility and Reflection” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 42 (1):3-41.
- Kelly, T. 2013, “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 66 (3):612–640.
- Kern, A. 2017, *Sources of Knowledge*, HUP.
- Lavin, D. 2011, “Problems of Intellectualism”, *Jurisprudence* 2(2): 367-78.
- McHugh, C./Way, J. 2018, “What is Reasoning?”, *Mind* 127 (505): 167-96.
- Neta, R. 2019, “The Basing Relation”, *The Philosophical Review*, 128 (2): 179-212.
- Raz, J. 2011, *From Normativity to Responsibility*, OUP.
- Rinard, S. 2017, “No Exception for Belief” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 94 (1):121-143.
- Rohrbaugh, G. 2015, “Inner Achievement”, *Erkenntnis*, 80 (6): 1191-1204.
- Sosa E. 2015, *Judgment and Agency*, OUP.
- Silverstein, M. 2016, “Reducing Reasons”, *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, 10 (1): 1-22.
- Way, J. Forthcoming, “Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning”, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*.