

## PLANO DE ENSINO

**Disciplina:** Epistemic Normativity (disciplina em inglês)  
**Horário:** quarta-feira, 18:00-22:00      **Créditos:** 4 cr  
**Semestre:** 2019/1  
**Docente(s):** David Horst

### **Súmula**

Análise dos trabalhos recentes sobre a normatividade epistêmica. A disciplina vai ser em inglês (mas a avaliação pode ser feita em português).

### **Objetivo**

According to many, epistemology is a normative discipline. That is, many think that beliefs can be normatively assessed in various ways. We do so, the idea goes, when we assess beliefs as correct or incorrect, justified or unjustified, rational or irrational, being supported by reasons or lacking such support. Given the apparent normativity of belief, epistemologists are increasingly concerned with the sort of question that has been the traditional focus of their colleagues in ethics: questions concerning the ground, scope, and unity of various forms of normative assessment. In this seminar, we will look at important recent work on epistemic normativity. Topics include: the aim of belief, reasons for belief, epistemic rationality, pragmatic reasons for belief, doxastic voluntarism, epistemic instrumentalism, and the sources of epistemic norms.

### **Conteúdo Programático**

#### **Week 1-4: The Aim of Belief**

Reading:

Bernard Williams, “Deciding to Belief”

David Velleman, “On the Aim of Belief”

David Owen, “Does Belief Have an Aim?”

#### **Week 5-9: Evidentialism vs. Pragmatism about Reasons for Belief**

Reading:

Nishi Shah, “A New Argument for Evidentialism”

Thomas Kelly, “The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes”

Jonathan Way, “Two Arguments for Evidentialism”

Susanna Rinard, “Against the New Evidentialists”

Pamela Hieronymi, “The Wrong Kind of Reason”

### **Week 10-12: Epistemic Rationality**

Reading:

Thomas Kelly, “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique”

Selim Berker, “Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions”

Susanna Rinard, “No Exception for Belief”

### **Week 13-15: Doxastic Voluntarism**

Reading:

William Alston, “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification”

Pamela Hieronymi, “Controlling Attitudes”

Pamela Hieronymi, “Responsibility for Believing”

### **Week 16-19: Sources of Epistemic Normativity**

Reading:

Nishi Shah, “How Truth Governs Belief”

David Enoch, “Agency, Shmagency”

Charles Côte-Bouchard, “Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?”

David Horst, “In Defense of Constitutivism About Epistemic Normativity”

### **Método de Trabalho**

Aulas expositivas; leitura conjunta e discussão da bibliografia. A aula ver ser em INGLÊS (mas o trabalho escrito pode ser feito também em português).

### **Método de Avaliação**

O conceito final será determinado a partir dos seguintes critérios: participação em aula e trabalho escrito.

### **Bibliografia**

Bernard Williams, “Deciding to Believe”

David Velleman, “On the Aim of Belief”

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