I’m interested in what we see in so far as this tells us something about the experience of seeing it. I’m interested, that is, in is what is occurring in your head when you see things—the conscious experience you can, and sometimes do, extinguish by merely closing your eyes. Closing your eyes doesn’t change the world, at least not that part of it you see, but it does change your experience of it. What I’m concerned with is the question of how much of the (visible) detail in the world, how much of the objective texture out there, is captured and thus represented in this subjective experience.

What we see is often a complex, multi-element array: a street filled with moving people and cars, a forest dense with trees and underbrush, a room full of furniture and bric-a-brac. In looking at such scenes, even in a momentary glance, we have the impression of seeing a lot—a lot more, in fact, than we can describe or remember. We certainly seem to see more than we consciously attend to. What I’m concerned with here is how much of that detail, how much of that texture out there in the world, is captured in here, in our conscious experience of this world. And if there is a lot of the detail in here (as I believe there is), how

*I thank the participants of the 2008 SPAWN conference at Syracuse for persistent and insightful questions. Also the tough questioning by my commentators, Sven Walter and Markus Wild, and others who attended the conference on perceptual experience organized by Andreas Kemmerling in Heidelberg in September 2008. An early version of this paper was given as the Howison Lecture at Berkeley in November 2007. In every case revisions were in progress within hours. I also thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for their support of this research.
might one possibly demonstrate this to be so.

When I talk about what we see, I mean to be talking about what we are conscious (aware) of. If one isn’t conscious of x, one doesn’t (as I use the word) see x. The word “perception” is often used more inclusively in cognitive studies. One perceives x if one gets information about x via an accredited sensory system whether or not this information is embodied in a conscious experience. Blindsight is thus classified as a form of vision. Although the subject isn’t conscious of x, she is nonetheless said to perceive x if she gets information about x through the eyes. A statistically significant number of correct answers when asked to guess (this is called “forced choice”) about the properties of x demonstrate (according to this way of talking) perception of x. In this case, S perceives x, as they say, without awareness of x. Unconscious perception.

I have no quarrel with this usage. I merely register my own way of using words. I am concerned with S’s perception of x when S is aware of x, when the information (about x) is embodied in a conscious experience of x. I am interested in how much of what you perceive you actually see.

Before I begin, though, a word or two about the kinds of things we see. We see (or describe ourselves as seeing) objects, properties, and facts. Confusion here can and very often does muddy the waters I am trying to negotiate. So I take moment to remind you of important differences.

**OBJECTS & EVENTS**
[spatio-temporal particulars: anything existing or occurring at a place and during a time]
sticks, stones, people, houses, trees, stars, . . . battles, games, deaths, weddings, . . .
Fingers are objects. The experience one has in seeing three fingers is different from the experience one has in seeing two or four fingers. These experiences have a different texture. The number of objects one sees—whether fingers, people, trees, stars or leaves—makes a difference to the texture of experience (there are isolated exceptions to this rule, but I ignore them here). So, too, does the number of events: games, collisions, and gestures. I don’t argue for this. I take it as obvious.

We also see properties. The properties we see also contribute to the texture of experience. A multicolored object—a flag with 50 stars and 13 stripes on it—contributes greater texture to an experience than does a white sheet. A star-shaped object has more texture than a circle. I’m not sure how to argue for this (since the notion of texture I’m working with is so ill-defined), but, once again, it seems more or less obvious to me, and if it isn’t obvious to you, treat it as my way of telling you what I mean by the texture of conscious experience.

And, finally, there are the facts we see—the fact that his tie is blue, his eyes are closed, or my keys are on the table. The facts we see are simply what we come to know
by seeing objects and properties. Typically, I see (the fact) that my keys are on the table by seeing the keys (an object), the table (another object) and the relation between them (the first being on the other). I don’t have to see the objects and properties that figure in the facts I see, but to see a fact I have to see some objects and properties. I can see that the battery in my cell phone needs charging by seeing not the battery but the little icon (representing battery charge) on the screen. Perception is indirect when one sees a fact by seeing objects other than those constitutive of the fact, objects that indicate, by their properties or behavior, the fact in question.

OBJECTS

SEEING

PROPERTIES

FACTS [things we come to know by seeing objects and properties]

that her eyes are blue
that my keys are on the table
that it (what you see) is a squirrel
that A and B are different
that A is moving

The facts we see do not contribute to the texture of experience. We both see the daffodil. We see it from the same angle and in the same light. It looks exactly the same to both of us. You, an experienced gardener, see what kind of flower it is. You see (the fact) that it is a daffodil. I don’t. We nonetheless have exactly the same experience. An
experienced diagnostician sees more (facts) when he examines the X-ray photograph, but not—not necessarily—more objects or properties. He sees more facts because he understands, as you don’t, what those shadows (you both see) mean or indicate.

These verbal distinctions are more or less obvious. At least I hope they are. Over the years, though, I have found that ignoring them leads to philosophical trouble. Let me mention some of this trouble since it threatens to spill over onto the present topic.

Suppose one does not distinguish the perception of facts from the perception of objects. Seeing an apple (an object) is then unthinkingly conflated with seeing a fact—that it is an apple. Once this confusion is in place, ignorance (or skepticism) about the world is transformed into a form of blindness. The transformation goes something like this:

Fallacy 1:

1. I do not know for certain that this (what I experience) is an apple; I could be dreaming or I could be deceived in some way.
2. So I cannot see (the fact) that there is an apple before me
3. Therefore I do not see an apple (a physical object) before me

What, then, do I see? An apple-appearance, idea, sense-datum, impression—something that facts concerning which can be known for certain. Ignorance of what is in the physical world leads, in a few (fallacious) steps, to the conclusion that one does not see (at least not directly) the physical world.

This fallacy doesn’t shed any darkness on the issue we are concerned with—the texture of conscious experience—since whether one sees an apple or merely an apple idea the experience is (presumably) the same. The perceptual experience has the same texture whether you are a realist or an idealist about the (direct) objects of perception.
Nonetheless, this fallacy gets the ball rolling in the wrong direction. So consider the next fallacy. It takes us directly to our topic.

**Fallacy 2:**

1. One cannot see the color of objects in (extreme) peripheral vision (the light from which strikes only the rods which are not color sensitive). If one sees a blue circle in peripheral vision, then, one does not see its color (its blueness).

2. Therefore one cannot see the colored objects (the blue circle) in peripheral vision. The only objects seen are those that are foveated (light from which hits the color sensitive and densely packed cones of the retinae).

This is obviously a confusion of seeing the properties of objects—their color in this case—with seeing the objects that have those properties. But one doesn’t have to see the size, shape, orientation, or color of x to see x. I see things at a distance when their color, shape and orientation is not apparent. Objects can contribute to the texture of experience without revealing much at all about their character.

**Fallacy 3:**

1. S does not see (detect, notice) the difference between A and B

2. So S does not see (the fact) that they differ

3. The difference between A and B is x (some object) or P (some property).

4. Therefore, S does not see x (or P)—the object or property that makes A and B different.

This is the fallacy one often finds committed in descriptions of change blindness. The fallacy pivots on the ambiguity between an object and a fact sense of “the difference.” The difference between A and B can be either (a) an object that makes them different or
(b) the fact that they are different. You don’t have to see (the fact) that A and B differ in order to see the objects that make them different. People who don’t see the difference (= fact) between A and B might nonetheless see the object that makes them different. When this happens, the texture of conscious experience is different without an awareness of the fact that they are different. To deny this possibility is to confuse object perception with fact perception. It is to confuse ignorance—failure to know a fact—with blindness, failure to see an object.

So we have to keep alert to the difference between the objects, the properties, and the facts we see. If we want to reach conclusions about the texture of experience, about what kind of detail in the world is represented in our conscious experience of the world, we should be careful not to reach these conclusions from what a person doesn’t know, from the facts a person can’t see. What a person doesn’t know is one thing, what the person doesn’t see, what properties and objects he is not conscious of, is quite another.

Consistent observance of these distinctions, however, leads to a serious problem. At least people have nagged me about it and called it a problem for at least thirty years. If S needn’t notice x to be conscious of x, what possible basis, what possible test, can be used to determine the character, quality, and texture of S’s experience? If S needn’t be aware of (the fact that there are) differences in his own conscious experiences in order for such differences to exist, how can we—on the outside, as it were—presume to say whether they do or do not exist? How can there be a science of consciousness if consciousness is this inaccessible?

There are, though, degrees of inaccessibility. People can know things and they can evince this knowledge in their behavior (thus letting us know they know it) without
knowing—without even thinking—they know it. If what a person knows about x that we, but not he, knows he knows is something the person can only know by seeing x, then we have a way of demonstrating that that person (without knowing it) saw x. We thereby have a way of accessing a person’s conscious experience that the person himself doesn’t enjoy.

Look, for just a moment, at this collection (call it collection A) of grey balls (they are just ink dots on the page, I know, but think of them as grey three-dimensional balls or balloons:

Collection A:

A quick glance (1 or 2 seconds) is enough to see that all the balls are grey. None of them are purple, black, or yellow. If we numbered the balls from left to right, we could express what you could see (and thus know) to be the case in that brief glance as thirteen distinct propositions. You knew (because you could see) that

#1 is grey
#2 is grey
#3 is grey
.
.
.
#13 is grey

Since this list mentions all the balls in A, there is a sense (call it the distributive sense) in which you saw that all the balls in A were grey. There is, though, another sense (call it
the **collective sense**) in which you did not—indeed, could not--see that all the balls in A were grey.

To illustrate the difference between distributive and collective knowledge of all members of a collection suppose Clyde is attending a party and steps outside to smoke a cigarette. He sees Carol come out and leave. Then Susan. Then George. This goes on for several minutes. It turns out that, unknown to Clyde, everyone has left the party. No one is left in the room. While standing outside, he, without realizing it, watched everyone leave. So there is a sense (this is the distributive sense) in which Clyde knows something about everyone who was at the party. He knows Carol left, that Susan left, that George left, and so on for everyone at the party. Clyde, though, doesn’t know that everyone left because he doesn’t know whether he saw everyone leave. Maybe there are still some people in the room. He doesn’t know. As Bertrand Russell once noted about inductive inference, to know that all crows are black, one has to do more than examine every crow and find it to be black. One must also know that one has examined all the crows. This is something that may not be known by someone who has, in fact, examined all the crows. Contrast this with Clyde returning to the room after smoking his cigarette and finding the room empty. While he was out of the room everyone left by the back door. Although Clyde didn’t see a single person leave, he now comes to know (by seeing the empty room) that everyone has left the party. This is the collective way of knowing something about all the members of a collection. Clyde now knows that everyone left the party not (as in the first scenario) by seeing individuals depart (he didn’t see anyone depart this time), but by seeing (via the emptiness of the room) that all of them left. He comes to
know indirectly that Carol left because he knows Carol was at the party and, as he can plainly see, everyone has left the party.

Returning, then, to our grey balls, the claim is that one knows (because one can see) in a distributive sense that all the balls in A are grey. One knows something about each member of collection A—that it is grey—in the same way Clyde, standing outside the room, knows something about every person at the party—that he or she left. And just as Clyde doesn’t (or needn’t) know that everyone at the party left just because he knows of everyone who was at the party that he or she left, you do not (or need not) know that all the balls in A are grey just because you know the color of each ball in A. To know that all the balls in A are grey one would have to know more than the thirteen propositions listed above (ball #1 is grey, ball #2 is grey, . . .). One would also have to know that those were all the balls in A, and this is something one might not know. One might see all the balls in collection A, and see (in the distributive sense) that they are all grey, without being able to tell whether those are all the balls in A. Suppose, for instance, that a small orange ball is hidden behind one of the (visible) grey balls. You can’t see it. Then all the balls in this collection would not be grey, but the collection would, nonetheless, look exactly the same to you. Since you couldn’t tell in the brief glance you had of A whether one or more balls are concealed, you can’t tell whether all the balls in A are grey. So you cannot see (and therefore do not know in the collective sense) that all the balls in A are grey. Nonetheless, since you were, in fact, looking at a collection of grey balls, all of which were completely visible, you did see (and thus did know in the distributive sense) of each ball in the collection that it was grey.

Logicians have a crisper and more elegant way of expressing this distinction between distributive and collective knowledge of a collection. The scope of the universal
quantifier is different. In one case the quantifier is outside the knowledge operator, in the
other case inside.

**Distributive Knowledge of the balls:** For all x, if x is a ball in collection A, you know that x
is grey.

It is in this sense that you can see (and thus know) that all the balls in collection A are grey.

**Collective Knowledge of the balls:** You know that for all x, if x is a ball in collection A, it
is grey.

In this sense you do not know, by seeing, that all the balls in A are grey. For all you can
tell, just by looking, there may be one or more colored (orange, blue, etc.) balls in A.
They may be hidden behind larger grey balls.

Well, then, if you really did come to know that ball #7 (to pick one of the balls at
random) was grey, you must have seen ball #7. You can’t know, by seeing, that an object
is grey without seeing the object (I will qualify this in a moment). One might, of course,
receive information about an object—that it is grey--without seeing it. One might also,
and without realizing it, use this information to make a decision about what to say when
asked to guess about the color of the object. The guesses might then, more often than not,
be correct. Something like this apparently happens in blindsight. You, though, didn’t
have to guess about the color of #7. Unlike a person who doesn’t see #7, a person who
isn’t conscious of #7, you knew (the fact) that #7 was grey because you saw #7. You, in
fact, without knowing it, saw every ball in row A. That is why you could see and hence
knew (in the distributive sense) that all them were grey.

The above list of facts (about the color of the individual balls) you saw is a very
definite list. It contains one fact for each ball, a total of thirteen facts. Without counting
the balls you, of course, don’t know how many facts about the color of balls you know.
You don’t know how many items there are on this list. If the numbers of balls in the row had been twelve instead of thirteen (call this collection B),

Collection B:

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you would—without realizing it--have had only twelve pieces of knowledge about the color of balls. You might (glancing back and forth) not notice the difference between collections A and B (difference blindness), not notice that there are fewer balls in B. So, without realizing it, you would know more when looking at A than when looking at B. The list of facts you know when looking at row A is longer than the list of facts you know when looking at B. The explanation of why you (without realizing it) know more (facts) when looking at A is that you (without realizing it) see more objects when looking at A. The texture of your experience is different when viewing collections A and B, and this is reflected in your knowledge.

How do I know it is different? How do I know your experience is different if you (without realizing that A and B differ) don’t know it is different? Well, I know things you don’t know. You, perhaps, didn’t notice it, but having constructed A and B, I know A differs from B. A has one more ball. I also know—or if I don’t know, I can find out by testing you--that you can, in a quick glance, see (in the distributive sense) whether all the balls in A are grey. So I know you (without realizing it) know more when looking at A than you know when looking at B. If one of the balls is black, for instance, you, in one quick glance, spot it immediately.
You, obviously, can see (distributive sense) whether any ball in collection A is black, a collection of thirteen balls. You must, therefore, see all thirteen balls in collection A. On the basis of your performance and my knowledge, then, I know you see all thirteen balls when looking at A. I know your experience when looking at A is different—richer, more textured—than it is when looking at B. Lacking my special knowledge, you don’t know this. I, therefore, know things about your conscious experience that you don’t know.

In reaching this conclusion I have used a test, a criterion, for consciousness of an object (and, thus, for the texture of experience) that needs qualification. I have been assuming that:

**T: If S sees (and thus knows) that x is F, S sees (is conscious of) x**

This, in effect, is a test that uses fact-perception (seeing that x is F) as a guide to object-perception (seeing x) and, thus, as a guide to the texture of conscious experience. You can’t know, by seeing, that x is F unless you see x. T needs qualification.

I earlier mentioned indirect perception: seeing—by the blinking icon—that my cell phone battery needs charging. This sort of case constitutes an obvious counterexample to T. I see that x (my battery) is F (needs charging) without seeing x. So I hereby qualify T. There must be no intermediate object, condition, or state of affairs (like the blinking icon on my cell phone) the perception of which provides the information that enables one to know that x is F without seeing x. The fact-perception (that x is F) must be direct.
**T*: If S directly sees (and thus knows) that x is F, S sees (is conscious) of x

But isn’t \( T^* \) just a way of saying that one’s knowledge (that x is F) must come by way of seeing (consciousness of) x itself? Aren’t we, then, back to where we started—trying to figure out (in determining whether the perception is direct or not) when one is conscious of x?

Not quite. Excluding indirect ways of seeing facts about x is a way of excluding a variety of ways in which one can get information about x without seeing x itself, and although there are cases in which this is hard to judge or just plain puzzling (can one see that someone is angry in a direct way? Or is it always indirect?) there are applications in which this is reasonably clear. In looking at collection A, did one come to know the balls were grey in some indirect way? If so, what intermediate object or condition was it that told one this? If one didn’t see ball #7 itself when declaring that all the balls in A were grey, what, then, did one see that indicated that #7 (not to mention every other ball) was grey? There doesn’t seem to be any plausible candidate for this intermediate condition, nothing between the viewer and ball #7 that, so to speak, conceals #7 (so you can’t see it), but nonetheless conveys information about #7’s color. I can easily imagine seeing that x is grey by looking at a photograph or by using instruments that register x’s color but nothing like this going on in one’s perception of the balls in A. If this is indirect, it is up to the person who claims it is indirect to explain why and how it is.

Let me mention, though, a possibility in this regard (the present example is mine, but I thank John Campbell for the idea). Consider the way we can see (indirectly) what is true of the members of a collection by seeing the collection itself but not its members. Unlike a photograph or a measuring instrument, a collection of things does not exactly
come between its members and the viewer. So imagine you see a flock of geese flying south. The geese are too far away and bunched too close together to see the individual geese, but the flock is visible. It looks like a small dark cloud in the sky. Yet, though you don’t see individual geese, you get information about individual geese: each goose is flying south.¹ So you know something about individual geese without seeing individual geese. Why isn’t seeing that the balls in collection A are grey like this? One sees something to be true of the individual balls not by seeing the individual balls but by seeing, so to speak, the flock of balls and inferring what must be true of the individual balls in the flock.

This is, of course, indirect perception because one is getting information about the individual balls not by seeing them, but by seeing the collection of which they are members. So we already have the answer to this objection. There is, first, the obvious point that A doesn’t look like a flock of indistinguishable balls. It looks, even in a brief glance, like a bunch of individual balls. If we put this point aside, though, perhaps on the grounds that phenomenology is untrustworthy, there is the fact that if one saw that ball #7 was grey in this way, then one’s knowledge that ball #7 is grey would be derived from the collective knowledge that all the balls in A are grey. As we have seen, though you do not have to know (collectively) that all the balls in A are grey in order to see (know) that each one is grey. One’s knowledge that ball #7 is grey is not derived from the general

¹ I have been told by both Sven Walter and Markus Wild that there might easily be one or more “wayward” geese in this flock flying west without any change in the appearance of the flock. So we don’t get information about all the members of the collection from the behavior or appearance of the collection itself. I’m afraid they are right about the geese. But I like the example too much to give it up. For those who insist on verisimilitude with examples, think of a herd of cows instead of a flock of geese. I know Bossie (indeed, every cow in this herd) is in field F because that is where I (from a great distance) see the herd is.
knowledge that all the balls in A are grey (and that #7 is a ball in A) because one sees, and thus knows, that #7 is grey without knowing the general truth that all the balls in A are grey. So seeing that ball #7 (and every other ball in A) is grey is not like seeing that goose #7 (and every other goose in the flock) is flying south. Unlike the flock of geese, one can easily see that ball #7 (and each of the other thirteen balls in A) is grey without being able to see, without knowing (collectively), whether all the balls in A are grey.

My claims about what you see when looking at A and, thus, my claims about your conscious experience are, of course, empirical claims. I am assuming that you are a normal perceiver, that you are viewing things at a normal distance and in suitable lighting. These assumptions may not always be true. It may turn out that someone followed my directions, but didn’t see ball #7. Blind in one eye, his glance with the good eye was so brief (too brief for a saccade) that for the entire duration of his glance, the image of #7 fell on the blindspot of his good eye. All the balls he could see looked grey, but these balls would have looked grey even if #7 had been blue. So he didn’t see (collectively or distributively) that all the balls in A were grey even though he thought (and said) he did see this. Not very likely, I suppose, but who am I to say that it (or something like it) never happens. So my claims about the texture of perceptual experience must be understood to be empirical—and thus possibly false—claims. They are, nonetheless, testable claims about people viewing complex scenes. Most of us, I assume, see all the balls when looking at A, but maybe some people won’t see them all even if they think they can. The texture of their experience, then, will be different than I say it is. That is the risk one runs in making empirical claims about other people’s conscious experience.
One final point about test $T^*$. This has to do with how one is to understand the alleged knowledge one acquires of each member as one looks at a large collection.

I had dinner with a friend, Andreas, last night. Today, in talking about the evening, I was asked by a nosy colleague whether Andreas was wearing a hat during dinner. I say he was not wearing a hat. My nosy colleague is an epistemologist and wants to know how I know he wasn’t wearing a hat. I reply by saying that Andreas was sitting across the table from me in a well-lit restaurant for two hours. I could see that he wasn’t wearing a hat. I did not, it is true, think about his apparel at the time—whether or not Andreas was wearing a hat—but now when asked about it, I’m completely certain he was hatless. My colleague persists. Since I did not consciously think about this matter until today (when asked), did I nonetheless know last night, before such a thought ever crossed my mind, that Andreas was hatless? If so, does this mean that one can see, and thus know, that $x$ is $F$ without thinking (judging, believing) that $x$ is $F$?

Yes it does. I didn’t just learn that Andreas wasn’t wearing a hat at dinner last night when my colleague asked me about it this morning. I knew it all along. I knew it last night. I remember that Andreas wasn’t wearing a hat and remembering $P$ is something one cannot do unless one (already) knew $P$. This is a kind of knowledge—call it tacit knowledge—one has in virtue of having had (and retained a memory of) a conscious experience evidentially sufficient for perceptual knowledge. Having (and retaining) such an experience qualifies as knowledge whether or not—at the time of the experience—one has any thoughts on the matter at all. This is why, despite not thinking about it until this very moment, I knew this morning that there were no giraffes in my room when I got out of bed.
I raise this issue here because the kind of knowledge we are talking about in $T^*$ is often—not always, but often—tacit knowledge. One sees a crowd of objects. Thoughts about their color, orientation, shape, and relative placement do not occur. One’s mind is elsewhere. One nonetheless knows things about the objects in this crowd. Collection A is not much of a crowd, as crowds go, but even in a quick glance, and without thinking about it, one knows something about each member of the crowd. One knows that ball #7 is grey even though the thought “The seventh ball from the left is grey” never occurs to one. One knows this and continues to know it as long as one retains, in memory, the experience one had in looking at A. This is tacit knowledge. It is tacit knowledge (tacit direct knowledge, of course) that according to $T^*$ suffices for awareness of the objects one has knowledge of.

So the absence of active and conscious thoughts at the time one views a complex scene should not be taken as indicative of the absence of knowledge. One tacitly knows, effortlessly, all manner of things about the world one sees just as I know, tacitly, and with no expenditure of cognitive effort, all manner of things about the contents of my bedroom this morning (come to think about it, there were no elephants there either) and Andreas’s appearance last night (now that I think about it, he didn’t smoke a cigarette either). And it is the existence of this knowledge—knowledge whose existence is ascertainable by others—that according to $T^*$ is symptomatic of the texture of conscious experience.

I realize that this conception of tacit knowledge is, perhaps, too liberal to square with our ordinary ways of thinking. It gives knowledge to those who really shouldn’t have it. It seems a stretch, for instance, to say of a person (a child, say) who doesn’t even know what a porcupine is that it knows (tacitly) that an animal it sees is a porcupine if he sees it nearby in good viewing conditions. Yes, the child’s conscious experience may represent the animal in
a way that is sufficient for knowledge by a person who knows what porcupines are and what they look like, but that doesn’t mean the child knows it is a porcupine. It would be better to say that only those who understand what an F is, only those who have the concept F, get to know, tacitly, that something is F by having the appropriate experience. Such a qualification would have to be imposed if one were to seriously propose tacit knowledge as a genuine form of knowledge.

I am, however, not much interested in arguing about whether tacit knowledge is a genuine form of knowledge. Whether it is really knowledge. I think it captures something interesting about perceptual knowledge—the way we can sometimes have it when it is not accompanied by conscious belief or judgment—but I introduce this notion to do a different job. Tacit knowledge is merely my—perhaps eccentric—way of describing a certain kind of conscious experience, an experience that is rich enough in information to yield knowledge to a properly situated agent. If it does this much, that will be enough for my purposes.

In keeping with my theme, and as a closing example, I offer two crowds of grey balls. My bet is that everyone of reasonably normal vision who looks at Figure 1 will have a (slightly) richer, a (slightly) more textured, conscious experience than when looking at Figure 2. They will see more. Why do I say this? Because they know more. They know that ball #43 in Figure 1 is grey, something they don’t know (because ball #43 isn’t there) when looking at Figure 2. If you know #43 is grey (this is testable), we can conclude, in accordance with T*, that when looking at Figure 1 you see, and are thus conscious of, #43 and its color. Since ball #43 isn’t in Figure 2, your conscious experience is different when looking at Figure 2. Even if you don’t know it is different (because you cannot see the difference between Figure 1 and 2) I do. And I can find out by testing you whether you can
tell in a quick glance whether ball #43 (or, indeed, any ball) is grey. If you can, then I can
tell you something you don’t know about your own conscious experience.

Figure 1

Figure 2