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Abstract for lecture in Sao Paolo, August 4, 2014: "Uses of 'I'."

In this lecture I defend the view that two kinds of self-consciousness support our use of 'I' in language and thought: consciousness of oneself as an embodied entity, and consciousness of oneself as engaged in establishing rational unity among the contents of one's mental states. Several recent analyses of 'I' have maintained that the former (consciousness of oneself as an embodied entity) was a necessary condition for any use of 'I', and that Kant had missed this point in the analysis he offered of what he calls "consciousness of oneself as subject." I defend Kant's notion of consciousness of oneself as subject and its distinction from consciousness of oneself as an embodied entity. I illustrate the distinction on a pathological case study recently offered by Oliver Sacks. In concluding my analysis of the case study, I suggest there is a significant connection between Kant's notion of "transcendental unity of apperception" and Freud's notion of "ego." I conclude with some remarks on our notions of "self" and "person" and on the importance of Kant's distinction between "consciousness of oneself as subject" and "consciousness of oneself as an object" for a wide range of philosophical issues in epistemology and in moral philosophy.