EPIDEMIOLOGY OF INFLUENZAVIRUS A (H5N1)ref : a digital archive of all suspected and laboratory confirmed human cases reported by the media. All readers are encouraged to signal eventual mistakes by posting referenced corrections to my e-mail.

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Table of contents :


  • 1997 and Feb 2003 Hong Kong outbreaks
  • 2003-2005 outbreak
  • Czech Republic
  • Croatia
  • Lithuania
  • Poland
  • Switzerland
  • Italy
  • Germany
  • Denmark
  • The Netherlands
  • Belgium
  • Sweden
  • Finland
  • France
  • Spain
  • Portugal
  • UK
  • Ireland
  • Africa :
  • Lybia
  • Zimbabwe
  • Malawi
  • Algeria
  • Morocco
  • Nigeria
  • Egypt
  • Mauritania
  • Chad
  • Congo
  • Niger
  • Cameroon
  • Senegal
  • Ethiopia
  • Uganda
  • Kenya
  • Botswana
  • Burkina Faso
  • Ivory Coast
  • Sudan
  • Djibouti
  • Oceania :
  • Australia
  • Fiji
  • Americas
  • Canada
  • USA
  • Bahamas
  • Brazil
  • maps
  • summary of H5N1-susceptible animals
  • summary H5N1 clusters in humans
  • web resources

  • On 6 Mar 2006, WHO spokeswoman Maria Cheng said told H5N1 poses a greater challenge to the world than any infectious disease, including AIDS, and has cost 300 million farmers more than $10 billion in its spread through poultry around the worldref.
    > 209 million poultry have died or been culled since January 2004 to July 2006 worldwide
    WHO case definitionsref :
  • SUSPECTED H5N1 CASE : a person presenting with unexplained acute lower respiratory illness with fever (>38 C) and cough, shortness of breath or difficulty breathing AND one or more of the following exposures in the 7 days prior to symptom onset:
  • (a) close contact (within 1 m) with a person (for example: caring for, speaking with, or touching) who is a suspected, probable, or confirmed H5N1 case;
  • (b) exposure (for example: handling, slaughtering, defeathering, butchering, preparation for consumption) to poultry or wild birds or their remains or to environments contaminated by their feces in an area where H5N1 infections in animals or humans have been suspected or confirmed in the last month;
  • (c) consumption of raw or undercooked poultry products in an area where H5N1 infections in animals or humans have been suspected or confirmed in the last month;
  • (d) close contact with a confirmed H5N1 infected animal other than poultry or wild birds (e.g. cat or pig);
  • (e) handling samples (animal or human) suspected of containing H5N1 virus in a laboratory or other setting.
  • PROBABLE H5N1 CASE (notify WHO)
  • Probable definition 1: a person meeting the criteria for a suspected case AND one of the following additional criteria:
  • a. infiltrates or evidence of an acute pneumonia on chest radiograph plus evidence of respiratory failure (hypoxemia, severe tachypnea) OR
  • b. positive laboratory confirmation of an influenza A infection but insufficient laboratory evidence for H5N1 infection.
  • Probable definition 2: a person dying of an unexplained acute respiratory illness who is considered to be epidemiologically linked by time, place, and exposure to a probable or confirmed H5N1 case.
  • CONFIRMED H5N1 CASE (NOTIFY WHO) : a person meeting the criteria for a suspected or probable case AND one of the following positive results conducted in a national, regional or international influenza laboratory whose H5N1 test results are accepted by WHO as confirmatory:
  • However, the following references indicate that atypical infections (encephalitis, diarrheal, gastrointestinal illness) are a serious concern associated with outbreaks of avian influenza A subtype H5N1 worldwideref1, ref2. Furthermore, European researchers have reported what they call the first evidence that low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses, and not just highly pathogenic (HPAI) strains like H5N1, can infect humans. The finding, in a study of Italian poultry workers, suggests that avian influenza viruses have more chances than previously suspected to mix with human influenza viruses, potentially creating hybrids that could trigger a human influenza pandemicref. Diarrhea and the detection of viral RNA in most fecal samples tested has been a frequent observation suggesting that H5N1 virus may replicate in the human gastrointestinal tract. This raises the
    question of whether human feces could be a source of transmissionref. Examples of asymptomatic human infection : WHO guidelines for investigation of human cases of avian influenza A(H5N1) - October 2006

    While much has been made of the fulminant cases of presumed viral pneumonia in 1918, Dr. Brundage's research indicates that the majority of pneumonia cases, even in 1918, were either secondary bacterial pneumonias following an influenza infection or mixed viral and bacterial pneumonias. In the pre-antibiotic era, these cases of bacterial pneumonia carried a very high mortality rate; however, with appropriate antibiotic therapy, many such patients may be saved. There is still a deficit of comprehensive seroprevalence data to establish the true frequency of subclinical infections and the relevance of these sporadic accounts of atypical infections listed above.

  • epidemics in Hong Kong :
  • since late 2003, the flu has struck hundreds of thousands of birds and prompted widespread poultry culls in Eastern Asiaref1, ref2. The current AI A/Vietnam/1196/2004(H5N1) virus HA nucleotide sequence is 97% identical to the one discovered at a goose farm in China's Guangdong Province in 1996 (A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96(H5N1) or Gd96), the same which led to the outbreak of AI in Hong Kong in 1997 and the death of a man in Feb 2003, Japanese researchers said on Thu 5 Feb 2004. In Hong Kong, the Gd96 virus has been continually found in ducks and geese exported from China since 1997. Governments throughout the region have slaughtered 100 million chickens, ducks, and other poultry in efforts to keep the virus from spreading. Phylogenetic analyses of the H5 HA genes from the 2004 and 2005 outbreak showed 2 different lineages of HA genes, termed clades 1 and 2. Viruses in each of these clades are distributed in non-overlapping geographic regions of Asia. The H5N1 viruses from the Indochina peninsula are tightly clustered within clade 1, whereas H5N1 isolates from several surrounding countries are distinct from clade 1 isolates and belong in the more divergent clade 2. Clade 1 H5N1 viruses were isolated from humans and birds in Viet Nam, Thailand, and Cambodia but only from birds in Laos and Malaysia. The clade 2 viruses were found in viruses isolated exclusively from birds in China, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea. Viruses isolated from birds and humans in Hong Kong in 2003 and 1997 made up clades 1* and 3, respectively. he HA genes from H5N1 viruses isolated from human specimens were closely related to HA genes from H5N1 viruses of avian origin; human HA gene sequences differ from the nearest gene from avian isolates from the sameyear in 2-14 nucleotides (<1% divergence). These findings are consistent with the epidemiologic data that suggest that humans acquired their infections by direct or indirect contact with poultry or poultry products. Analysis of the amino acid sequences showed that both clades of H5 HAs from the 2004-2005 outbreak have a multiple basic amino acid motif at thecleavage site, a defining feature of HPAI viruses. Among all H5N1 isolates collected in east Asia since 1997, only those in clades 1, 1*, and 3 appear to be associated with fatal human infections. NA genes from human and related avian H5N1 isolates from 2003-2005 as well as clade 3 isolates were characterized by deletions in the stalk region of the protein (positions 49-68 for clades 1-2 and 54-72 for clade 3). Deletions in the stalk of the NA are thought to increase retention of virions at the plasma membrane to balance weaker binding of sialic acid receptors by the HA with newly acquired N154 glycosylation. The phylogenetic tree of the M genes resembled that of the HA genes, indicating coevolution of these genes. The amino acid sequence of the M2 protein of clade 1 viruses as well as of HK/213/03 indicated a serine-to-asparagine substitution at residue 31 (S31N), known to confer resistance to adamantanes (including amantadine and rimantadine). All the currently circulating clade 1 isolates are resistant to adamantanes.  The PB2, PB1, and PA polymerase genes from 2003-2005 H5N1 isolates from humans constitute a single clade and have coevolved with the respective HA genes. No evidence of reassortment with polymerase genes from circulating H1N1 or H3N2 human influenza virus was found. The phylogenies of the NP and NS genes also supported the avian origin of these genes, indicating that all the genes from the human H5N1 isolates analyzed are of avian origin, which confirms the absence of reassortment with human influenza genes. Taken together, the phylogenies of the 8 genomic segments show that the H5N1 viruses from human infections and the closely related avian viruses isolated in 2004 and 2005 belong to a single genotype, often referred to as genotype Z. H5N1 isolates collected in 2004 and 2005 analyzed by the HI test showed reactivity patterns that correlated with the 3 main clades of recent isolates identified in the HA gene phylogeny. Viruses from humans and birds in clade 1 were found to constitute a relatively homogeneous and distinct antigenic group characterized by poor inhibition by ferret antisera to isolates from other clades, in particular by the ferret antiserum raised to HK/213/03 (64-fold reduction compared to the homologous titer). The latter isolate was previously used to develop a vaccine reference strain in response to 2 confirmed H5N1 human infections in February 2003. Antigenic analysis of human isolates from 2005 provided evidence of antigenic drift among the most recently circulating H5N1 strains. Inactivated influenza vaccines are manufactured from reassortant viruses obtained by transferring the HA and NA genes with the desired antigenic properties into a high-growth strain such as PR8. However, reassortants with H5-derived HA with a polybasic cleavage site are potentially hazardous for animal health. Because the high pathogenicity of the H5N1 viruses in poultry, mice, and ferrets depends primarily on the polybasic cleavage site in the HA molecule, a derivative with a deletion of this motif was engineered in cloned HA cDNAs. 3 high-growth reassortant influenza viruses were developed: NIBRG-14 (NIBSC), VN/04xPR8-rg (SJCRH), and VNH5N1-PR8/CDC-rg (CDC). These candidate vaccine strains, bearing mutant H5 HA, intact NA, and the internal genes from PR8, were generated by a reverse genetics approach using Vero cells and laboratory protocols compatible with eventual use of the vaccine in human subjects. These 3 vaccine candidates were characterized genetically (nucleotide sequencing of HA and NA) and antigenically in HI assays to confirm that their antigenicity remained unchanged relative to the wildtype virus. The candidate reference stocks had molecular and antigenic properties equivalent to parental H5N1 donor strains and lacked virulence in chicken, mouse, and ferret models. The origin of the HA genes of the 2004-2005 outbreak as well as an earlier isolate from a fatal human infection in Hong Kong in 2003 (clade 1*) can be traced back to viruses isolated in 1997 in Hong Kong (clade 3) and from geese in China (goose/Guangdong/96). The phylogeny also shows that viruses with HK/97-like HA may have circulated in avian hosts continuously after 1997 without causing any reported human infections until the 2 confirmed cases in Hong Kong in February 2003.  Genetic and antigenic analyses have shown that, compared to previous H5N1 isolates, 2004-2005 isolates share several amino acid changes that modulate antigenicity and perhaps other biological functions. Furthermore, molecular analysis of the HA from isolates collected in 2005 suggests that several amino acids located near the receptor-binding site are undergoing change, some of which may have an affect on antigenicity or transmissibility. Further surveillance to determine the prevalence of such variants in poultry will be critical to determine whether these variants compromise the efficacy of the candidate vaccine or increase the efficiency of transmission. The phylogenies of the 8 genomic segments from the clade 1 and 2 isolates from 2004-2005 showed that all genes are of avian origin. All H5N1 isolates from both clades belong to one of the genotypes recently circulating in Eastern and Southern Asia, e.g., genotypes V and Z. An effective H5N1 vaccine is a public health priority and the cornerstone for pandemic prevention and control. Reverse genetics approaches allow the rapid production of high-growth PR8 reassortant viruses by engineering a virus with a homologous HA gene lacking the polybasic amino acids associated with high virulence. These candidate H5N1 pandemic vaccine viruses have been made available to vaccine manufacturers to produce pilot lots for clinical trials and are available for possible large-scale manufacturing, should the need ariseref. Perhaps one of the most significant aspects of this analysis is the finding that antigenic drift is occurring and that some recent isolates are distinguishable from virus isolates that were chosen as the candidate vaccine antigens. This identifies a need for continued surveillance of poultry for the appearance of antigenic variants which may compromise the effectiveness of the current vaccine under development. A rolling program of vaccine development may be required to take account of possible changes in the antigenicity of the virus. 37 countries/territories are known to be have been infected by HPAI H5N1 virus since the start of the panzootic in December 2003 to Feb 2006 (alphabetical order): Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China (People's Rep.), Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong (SARPRC), Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnamref. In addition, the following 5 countries have officially reported H5 in avians: Bosnia & Herzegovina, Georgia, Laos, Pakistan & the Philippines.
  • Genetically and antigenically distinct sublineages of H5N1 virus have become established in poultry in different geographical regions of Southeast Asia, indicating the long-term endemicity of the virus, and the isolation of H5N1 virus from apparently healthy migratory birds in southern China. H5N1 influenza virus has continued to spread from its established source in southern China to other regions through transport of poultry and bird migration. The identification of regionally distinct sublineages contributes to the understanding of the mechanism for the perpetuation and spread of H5N1, providing information that is directly relevant to control of the source of infection in poultry. It points to the necessity of surveillance that is geographically broader than previously supposed and that includes H5N1 viruses of greater genetic and antigenic diversityref. The scientists took > 13,000 samples from migratory birds in Hong Kong's Mai Po Marshes and at Poyang Lake in southeastern China over 3 winters from 2002 to 2005. Among these, they found 6 H5N1 viruses, all collected from apparently healthy migratory ducks at Poyang Lake just before their migration north. The team also tested samples gathered from > 51,000 apparently healthy birds in live-poultry markets in southern China from January 2004 through June 2005. Testing detected 512 H5N1 viruses, including isolates from 58 of the 22,390 chickens tested, with most of the rest found in ducks. The analysis also included viruses recovered from the outbreak in migratory birds at Qinghai Lake in north-central China in 2005, along with isolates collected from poultry in Indonesia, Viet Nam, and Malaysia in the past 2 years. To trace the relationships among H5N1 samples, the researchers sequenced the genomes of 69 viruses recovered in China since January 2004 and 59 isolates gathered in Indonesia, Viet Nam, and Malaysia from August 2003 through May 2005. This enabled them to construct a phylogenetic chart, or family tree, of the viruses. 2 phylogenetic trees were constructed; one for the hemagglutining (HA) gene and one for the nucleoprotein (N) gene, which are largely congruent. Among other things, the analysis revealed that the hemagglutinin (HA) protein of all the viruses stemmed from the patriarch of highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses, a strain found in geese in China's Guangdong province in 1996. Viruses from particular regions formed distinct sublineages, which demonstrates the long-term persistence of the viruses in those regions. Parts of southern China represented an exception to this picture of regional "sublineages," in that the strains there were more diverse, falling into 4 different genotypes. Because the precursor of these H5N1 viruses ... was originally detected in southern China in 1996 and because H5N1 viruses in this region have the greatest genetic diversity, southern China is the most likely source of the emergent and re-emergent HPAI H5N1. The phylogenetic analysis also showed that one May 2005 virus from Viet Nam was much more closely related to a January 2005 Chinese strain than to other strains from Viet Nam, indicating that the virus probably had been recently introduced to Viet Nam from China via poultry. In fact, the authors say their findings suggest that H5N1 strains spread from southern China to Viet Nam 3 times; in 2001, 2003, and 2005. Therefore, control of this regional epizootic and its attendant pandemic threat requires that the source of virus in southern China be contained. Viruses from the Qinghai Lake outbreak matched up with those from migratory ducks at Poyang Lake, > 1000 miles away, which strongly argues that migrating birds can transfer the virus over long distances. The team found further support for this notion when they exposed a number of ducks and geese to H5N1 viruses and found that most of the ducks survived; the surviving ducks shed the virus for as long as 7 days after infection. Only 6 of the isolates that were sequenced had a mutation in the M2 protein that confers resistance to the older antiviral drug amantadine; the rest all had structures indicating sensitivity to the drug. US officials recently recommended against using amantadine and rimantadine to treat flu patients in winter 2006, because most of the circulating viruses had become resistant to them. Also, previous evidence of H5N1 resistance to the 2 drugs has led to a general assumption that they would be of little use if that virus evolves into a pandemic strain. The authors say the diversity they found among H5N1 samples challenges the wisdom of relying on just one strain to make a candidate vaccine for pandemic preparedness. The strains used to develop human vaccines must reflect the antigenic diversity observed across this wider region. 4 family groups of the H5N1 virus have been identified, with multiple substrains within each, but it appeared that only one was moving westward via a probably limited (migratory bird) speciesref

    Maps :

    Migratory flyways of wild bird populations. A world map with the main general migratory flyways of wild bird populations is shown (adapted from information collected and analyzed by Wetlands International). (A) Black dots indicate the locations of historical and current influenza virus surveillance sites from which data have been used in this manuscript. These global migration flyways are simplifications, and there are situations where populations behave differently from the common patterns. Migration patterns of Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos) (B) and Garganey (Anas querquedula) in Eurasia and Africa and Blue-winged Teal (Anas discors) in the Americas (C) (right and left parts of the map, respectively) are provided. Yellow color indicates breeding areas in which species are absent during winter, green indicates areas in which species are present around the year, and blue indicates areas in which species are only present in winter and do not breed. Arrows indicate the seasonal migration patterns

    Wetlands International, in partnership with EURING, undertook a preliminary assessment of ornithological data relevant to the spread of avian influenza for the European Union, including a process of ranking of species based on a number of ecological and habitat preference characteristics. Count, ringing and other ornithological data were mobilized for these species and analyzed. From the literature, 50% of the selected higher risk species were found to have been infected with HP H5N1 (against < 10% for non-selected species), suggesting that this analysis has provided a valuable scientific basis for identification of higher risk species as a 1st step towards the development of an early warning system for HPAI H5N1ref. By overlaying the known migratory population flyways of Anatidae species and by matching population-weighted flyway overlays against the traveling wave of frost, the pattern of spread of HPAI H5N1 virus along the Western Palaearctic in the 2nd half of 2005 may be consistent in space and time with the hypothesis that some Anatidae seeded the virus over long distances along their migrationsref.
    The spread of HPAI H5N1 virus from Russia and Kazakhstan to the Black Sea basin is consistent in space and time with the hypothesis that birds in the Anatidae family have seeded the virus along their autumn migration routesref : the initial outbreaks of (highly pathogenic) H5N1 virus in Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine occurred close to wetlands frequented by overwintering migratory waterfowl. While the spread of avian flu viruses from Siberia to Alaska may expectedly occur through transactions of wandering birds, transatlantic spread through Greenland should presumably be considered of paramount importance, because Greenland is actually the only place worldwide where migrating bird populations regularly and systematically occupy common territories from May to September every
    yearref.
    Data on phylogenetic relationships of virus isolates, migratory bird movements, and trade in poultry and wild birds were integrated to determine the pathway for 52 individual introduction events into countries and predict future spread. 9 of 21 of H5N1 introductions to countries in Asia were most likely through poultry, and 3 of 21 were most likely through migrating birds. In contrast, spread to most (20/23) countries in Europe was most likely through migratory birds. Spread in Africa was likely partly by poultry (2/8 introductions) and partly by migrating birds (3/8). Our analyses predict that H5N1 is more likely to be introduced into the Western Hemisphere through infected poultry and into the mainland USA by subsequent movement of migrating birds from neighboring countries, rather than from eastern Siberia. These results highlight the potential synergism between trade and wild animal movement in the emergence and pandemic spread of pathogens and demonstrate the value of predictive models for disease controlref.A study reported the feeding and migratory performance of wild migratory Bewick's swans (Cygnus columbianus bewickii Yarrell) naturally infected with low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A viruses of subtypes H6N2 and H6N8. Using information on geolocation data collected from Global Positioning Systems fitted to neck-collars, we show that infected swans experienced delayed migration, leaving their wintering site more than a month after uninfected animals. This was correlated with infected birds traveling shorter distances and fueling and feeding at reduced rates. The data suggest that LPAI virus infections in wild migratory birds may have higher clinical and ecological impacts than previously recognizedref. A methodology to analyse 87Sr/86Sr isotope ratios in bird feathers with very low Sr concentration using ultra-low blank ion-exchange chemistry combined with thermal ionisation mass spectrometry. For this study, Sedge Warbler (Acrocephalus schoenobaenus) feathers were used from four different locations within Europe. Prior to analyses, dust particles from the feathers surface were removed with nitrogen gas. The shaft and the vane parts of the feather were analysed separately. Generally, the vane had higher trace element abundances compared to the shaft. The vane contained between 3 ng and 12 ng of Sr and the shaft between 0.5 ng and 3 ng of Sr. Due to the small amount of Sr in the feathers, small loads (0.5–12 ng Sr) of international standard NBS 987 were analysed for 87Sr/86Sr isotope ratios giving an average of 0.710263 ± 0.000013 (2) (n = 177) and an external reproducibility below 0.002%. The average 88Sr beam intensities for all the shaft analyses were 0.79 V while for the vane analyses it was 2.7 V, consistent with the measured Sr contents of the feather shafts and vanes. The 87Sr/86Sr isotope ratios of the vane were more precise than the shaft with 2 SD internal precision of 0.0026% and 0.053%, respectively. However, the precision was adequate for resolving Sr isotope variations between localities. The 87Sr/86Sr isotope ratios of the cleaned Sedge Warbler feathers varied geographically and were indicative of the different geology in the locations where the feathers were grownref. The red dot in the time line denotes the occurrence of the first human case, followed by the number of confirmed human cases in that country. The green and blue solid bars represent documented H5N1 infection in domestic poultry and wild birds, and dashed bars indicate that H5N1 in the avian population is suspected :

    Because H5N1 has been confirmed in Nigeria, Egypt, Germany and Spain, which straddle the intersections of the Black Sea/Mediterranean and the East Atlantic flyways, over the next 6 weeks, we should not be surprised to hear of H5N1 bird and even human cases in several northern European nations, including Britain and Iceland.By June or July 2006, if the biological imperatives continue to follow their course, H5N1 should turn up in eastern Siberia, and then Alaska, via the East Asia flyway. It might also at that time jump from Iceland, via Greenland, to northern Canada. Once in the Arctic zones of the Americas, H5N1 will be able to follow any, or all, of the 4 primary north/south flyways that span the Americas, from the Arctic to Tierra del Fuego. It is in the realm of reasonable probability that H5N1 will reach the United States this summer or early autumn 2006ref.

    Trains may play a role in the spread of H5N1, as they have in past outbreaks. In the USA in 1925, people were shipping poultry to New York live bird markets. Then, dirty, contaminated crates were being shipped back. This contributed to the spread of a HPAI outbreak. The trans-Asian railway system fits the temporal and spatial pattern of virus distribution starting in July 2005. It would be extremely unusual for water birds to be migrating thousands of miles in July and August, a time when they are ordinarily taking care of their young. Even today, it is normal to ship chickens by rail in many places. Birds also can be found on buses and trucks under circumstances that could contribute to spreading the virusref. Therefore, as of Jan 9, 2007ref:
     
    Country

     

    2003
    2004
    2005
    2006
    2007
    last date of onset
    Total
    cases
    deaths
    cases
    deaths
    cases
    deaths
    cases
    deaths
    cases
    deaths
    cases deaths case fatality rate (CFR)
    Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 5 0 0 April 2006 8 5 62.5%
    Cambodia 0 0 0 0 4 4 2 2 0 0 April 2006 6 6 100.0%
    China 1 1 0 0 8 5 12 8 0 0 June 2006 21 14 66.7%
    Djibouti 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 April 2006 1 0 0.0%
    Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 10 0 0 September 2006 18 10 42,8%
    Indonesia 0 0 0 0 19 12 55 45 2 1 January 2007 76 58 76,2%
    Iraq 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 July 2006 3 2 100.0%
    Thailand 0 0 17 12 5 2 3 3 0 0 July 2006 25 17 63.6%
    Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 4 0 0 January 2006 12 4 33.3%
    Viet Nam 3 3 29 20 61 19 0 0 0 0 October 2006 93 42 45.2%
    Total 4 4 46 32 97 42 114 79 2 0 263 158 60,0%
    ref :




    50% of the cases occurred in people under the age of 20 years; 90% of cases occurred in people under the age of 40 years. Case fatality was high in all age groups but was highest in persons aged 10 to 39 years, different from that seen in seasonal influenza, where mortality is highest in the elderly. The overall case fatality rate was highest in 2004 (73%), followed by 63% to date in 2006, and 43% in 2005. Assessment of mortality rates and the time intervals between symptom onset and hospitalization and between symptom onset and death suggests that the illness pattern has not changed substantially during the 3 years. Cases have occurred all year round. However, the incidence of human cases peaked, in each of the 3 years in which cases have occurred, during the period roughly corresponding to winter and spring in the northern hemisphere. If this pattern continues, an upsurge in cases could be anticipated starting in late 2006 or early 2007ref.
    All the steps for outbreak containment have to be done within 2-3 weeks. As of now ... even reporting the first step, it takes sometimes > 2 weeks for half of the casesref.
    The corresponding totals for the year 2006 so far give an indication of the current situation and are the following: Azerbaijan, 8 cases and 5 deaths; Cambodia 2 cases and 2 deaths; China, 10 cases and 7 deaths; Egypt 12 cases and 4 deaths; Indonesia; 15 cases and 13 deaths; Iraq, 2 cases and 2 deaths; Thailand, no cases and no deaths; Turkey, 12 cases and 4 death; and Viet Nam, no cases and no deaths.
    Of 74 people who have died in the Asian outbreak of H5N1 avian influenza, only 4 or 5 full post-mortems have been carried out, all of them in Thailand. The main barriers in the countries that have confirmed human cases -- Thailand, Viet Nam, Cambodia, China and Indonesia -- are cultural and religious. Islam, for example, prohibits postmortem examinations under most circumstances. Human cases have occurred in 3 phases:

    Demographic data : age was reported for 116 human H5N1 influenza cases. According to these data, 50% of cases occurred in individuals 16 years or younger, 75% of cases were 29 years or younger, and 90% of cases were aged < 39 yearsref. The reasons for the concentration of cases in children and young
    adults are unclearref. If one stratifies by country of origin, the mean ages of cases is somewhat lower in Turkey: for 116 cases on whom the information is available, the ages range from 1-69 years of age, with a mean age of 19.8 years (SD 14.6). By country of origin: A 17 Jun 2005 update of the OIE on the disease situation in all countries affected with the H5 serotype in Asia can be accessed here. According to OIE summarised graph "Outbreaks of Avian Influenza (subtype H5N1) in poultry from the end of 2003 to 31 Mar 2006", the world's 10 most affected countries (in brackets, number of outbreaks) are: Viet Nam (2312), Thailand (1078), Indonesia (209), Turkey (168), Russia (121), China (79), Nigeria (60), Romania (57), Ukraine (22), and South Korea (19)ref. In view of the fact that China was the first H5N1-infected country, while taking into consideration its size and its huge poultry industry, China's reported figures seem strikingly low.
    It is interesting to note the expansion of the range of avian influenza among birds in Asia. After being more or less restricted to the Southeast Asian countries though 2004 and early 2005, this summer has seen it move into avian populations in northern Asian countries including northwestern China, Kazakhstan and Siberia. It looks like AI appeared: Looking at a map of the region, it is telling that these areas are in a rather direct north-west line from each other. Moreover, Qinghai province is also in line with Thailand and Northern Vietnam.Is it possible that a particular species of migratory bird travels this north-west route in the spring/summer and could be spreading the virus? We would be interested to know if there are (local?) experts with knowledge about specific Asian avian migratory routes who might be able to help pinpoint one or more avian species that could be spreading the virus. This would be interesting to know and would contribute to our understanding -- and perhaps to our ability to control -- these avian influenza outbreaks.
    2 drafted scientific papers from the D.I. Ivanovsky Institute of Virology, Russian Academy of Medical Sciences include details on "indication of influenza A/H5N1 virus by RT-PCR of cloaca/trachea samples" from 5 species of wild birds "without clinical features", collected near the center of the epizootic in the Novosibirsk region (July 2005). The birds were: Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos), 6/12 positives; Pochard (Aythya ferina), 12/33 positives; Great crested grebe (Podiceps cristatus), 1/2 positive; Coot (Fulica atra), 0/5 and Common tern (Sterna hirundo), 0/2. Out of a total of 54 non-clinical wild birds, 19 (35.2%) were positive. The papers also report the isolation of the A/H5N1 strain A/Grebe/Novosibirsk/29/05 from a Great crested grebe "without clinical features", collected near the center of the epizootic in the Novosibirsk region (July 2005)ref1, ref2.
    The UN FAO and OIE sponsored a meeting in Ho Chi Minh City from February 23 to 25, 2005.
    There are several main optional action schemes which HPAI-affected countries may apply when the control or eradication of HPAI within their territories is contemplated: (*The definition of stamping-out policy, according to chapter 1.1.1 ("General definitions") in OIE's Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2005 edition), is: "carrying out under the authority of the Veterinary Administration, on confirmation of a disease, the killing of the animals which are affected and those suspected of being affected in the herd and, where appropriate, those in other herds which have been exposed to infection by direct animal to animal contact, or by indirect contact of a kind likely to cause the transmission of the causal pathogen. All susceptible animals, vaccinated or unvaccinated, on an infected premises should be killed and their carcasses destroyed by burning or burial, or by any other method which will eliminate the spread of infection through the carcasses or products of the animals killed.
    This policy should be accompanied by the cleansing and disinfection procedures defined in this Terrestrial Code. The term "Modified stamping-out policy" should be sed in communications to the OIE whenever the above animal health measures are not implemented in full and details of the modifications should be given". While stamping out may involve, in addition to the affected premises, also the killing of animals in other sites (e.g. within a prescribed radius around the affected premises, or in-contacts in other locations), modified stamping out will include the killing of the affected flocks/herds or affected animals only, applying other, less severe measures in relation to unaffected in-contacts or adjacent/close holdings. Generally, stamping out policy is combined with non-vaccination policy, while modified stamping out is applied when vaccination is allowed or prescribed. Vaccination may be geographically restricted or general.) All the above 6 schemes must include the application of surveillance and basic, crucial biosecurity measures (quarantine of infected holdings, movement and transportation restrictions within areas to be
    defined, cleansing/disinfection etc). Additional variations may be considered, such as the use of DIVA (Differentiating Infected from Vaccinated Animals) strategy.
    A key international meeting, addressing the Global Strategy for the Progressive Control of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), was convened by FAO, OIE , WHO and the World Bank in Geneva during the second week of November 2005. The 600 participants from 100 countries discussed a strategy paper prepared by FAO and OIE, within the umbrella of the global framework for the control of transboundary animal diseases (GF-TADs), and in collaboration with WHOref. Prepared before the publication of the first reported human AI cases in China, the said document includes the following text in article 3.3.1.4 which deals with the situation in P.R.China -- indicating the recommended disease-control strategy there: "China experienced HPAI infection well before the current crisis began in late 2003 and early 2004. It has not reported any human cases, but has a vast duck population that acts as a source of infection for terrestrial poultry. China is vaccinating domestic poultry and ducks in high-risk areas, using locally produced inactivated vaccines, as the principal method of controlling the disease, given the widespread nature of HPAI in the country. Vaccine efficacy in ducks appears to be good, with a reportedly significant reduction in virus shedding. Within the immediate to medium-term (1-6 years) the current disease control strategies applied will be improved and consolidated. This will involve proactive, risk-based surveillance, stamping out, application of biosecurity measures, and strategic vaccination with well-defined good quality vaccines. Vaccination of terrestrial poultry will be linked with a well-structured post-vaccination surveillance programme to provide better information on the disease dynamics and the impact of increasing flock immunity in domestic poultry. Further field studies will be carried out to determine the impact of duck vaccination on the level and duration of virus shedding under field conditions. In the medium- to long-term (4-6 years) the disease will be pushed back into well-defined areas. This will provide an opportunity for the country to establish disease free compartments to trade safely in poultry products within 7-10 years." The new Chinese plan, published after the reporting of human cases and the further spread of the disease into additional provinces, seems to take the plan further from strategic vaccination (which usually involves commercial farms) into mass vaccination (meant to cover all domestic birds, including small- and backyard holdings). Such an action should entail the needed post-vaccination surveillance programme: an additional significant burden.
    Countries in the region have destroyed 100 million chickens and other birds to try to eliminate the virus : Asian nations may need at least USD 500 million in the next 3 years to eradicate the bird-flu virus and revive the poultry industry. Japan has pledged USD 1.6 million to help Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, and Viet Nam in their fights against bird flu. Vaccination has been started/ordered in: China (Central & Southern areas), Taiwan province of China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, and Pakistan. Preventive vaccination is planned in Myanmar.
    FAO's data (2002) on the pig populations in HPAI/H5N1-affected countries in the region : The total population in Asia and the Pacific is 569,435,100 (2002); the total world pig population is 941,021,700 (2002).
    Of the 7 Eastern Asian countries known to be infected since the end of 2003 with HPAI H5N1 virus, 2 countries -- Japan and Korea -- have managed to completely control and eradicate the disease as of July 2004. Unfortunately, this was not the case in the other affected countries, namely Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Thailand and Viet Nam, where the disease is still presentref.
    For the 8 other Asian countries -- Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, China, Vietnam, Pakistan and Malaysia -- the suspension of the imports of all poultry products and pet birds, now applicable until 31 Mar 2005 (see MEX/04/1509), have been extended by the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health until 30 Sep 2005, as AI is either still present in these countries or they cannot be certified as disease-free.
    Thousands of New Zealanders could die and > 750,000 could be sickened if the avian flu virus mutates and triggers a pandemic, severely straining the country's health-care resources. The death toll from the first wave of an avian flu pandemic in the country could reach 6,200 from 20,806 cases of serious illness. Overall, the number of New Zealanders sickened would probably range between 325,000 and 759,000, based on a computer model created by CDC. 1 out of every 4 people in the country of 4 million could consult a doctor or hospital, severely straining New Zealand's medical resources. At least 16,000 people would need urgent hospital treatment, and it is likely that these levels would overwhelm current hospital capacity for much of the epidemicref.
    At a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on Jul 4-5 2005, organized by FAO, OIE, and WHO, the institutions asked for USD 102 million in donations to fund a plan to control H5N1 avian influenza within a decade : donor countries have pledged < USD 30 million so far for containing avian flu over the next 3 years. The European Union has pledged another 50 million € [USD 59.531 million] for the period 2007-2011.
    Of the 3,175 pig sera tested, 8 (0.25%) were positive for avian H5N1 influenza viruses isolated in 2004 by virus neutralization assay and Western blot analysis. All H5N1 influenza viruses isolates from human infections in Thailand and Viet Nam during 2004 tested were found to replicate in the respiratory tract of swine, but failed to transmit to contact pigs. Virus titers from nasal swabs peaked on day 2, and low titers were detected in the liver of 2 of the 4 pigs tested. It was concluded that pigs can be infected with highly lethal Asian H5N1 viruses but that these viruses are not readily transmitted between pigs under experimental conditions. Another conclusion might be that the feared pandemic virus has yet to appear, and the vaccine developers still have time to develop, test and stockpile an H5N1 vaccine suitable and safe for use in humansref.
    To better understand the potential of H5N1 viruses isolated during this epizootic event to cause disease in mammals, we used the mouse and ferret models to evaluate the relative virulence of selected 2003 and 2004 H5N1 viruses representing multiple genetic and geographical groups and compared them to earlier H5N1 strains isolated from humans. 4 of 5 human isolates tested were highly lethal for both mice and ferrets and exhibited a substantially greater level of virulence in ferrets than other H5N1 viruses isolated from humans since 1997. 1 human isolate and all 4 avian isolates tested were found to be of low virulence in either animal. The highly virulent viruses replicated to high titers in the mouse and ferret respiratory tracts and spread to multiple organs, including the brain. Rapid disease progression and high lethality rates in ferrets distinguished the highly virulent 2004 H5N1 viruses from the 1997 H5N1 viruses. A pair of viruses isolated from the same patient differed by 8 amino acids, including a Lys/Glu disparity at 627 of PB2 (E627K), previously identified as an H5N1 virulence factor in mice. The virus possessing Glu at 627 of PB2 exhibited only a modest decrease in virulence in mice and was highly virulent in ferrets, indicating that for this virus pair, the K627E PB2 difference did not have a prevailing effect on virulence in mice or ferrets. The results demonstrate the general equivalence of mouse and ferret models for assessment of the virulence of 2003 and 2004 H5N1 viruses. However, the apparent enhancement of virulence of these viruses in humans in 2004 was better reflected in the ferretref. A series of H5N1 viruses isolated from healthy ducks in southern China since 1999 had progressively acquired the ability to replicate and cause disease in mice. The genetic basis of this change in host range was explored by comparing 2 of the viruses that are genetically similar but differ in their ability to infect mice and have different pathogenicity in mice. A/duck/Guangxi/22/2001 (DKGX/22) is nonpathogenic in mice, whereas A/duck/Guangxi/35/2001 (DKGX/35) is highly pathogenic. Reverse genetics was used to create a series of single-gene recombinants that contained one gene from DKGX/22 and the remaining 7 gene segments from DKGX/35. The PA, NA, and NS genes of DKGX/22 could attenuate DKGX/35 virus to some extent, but PB2 of DKGX/22 virus attenuated the DKGX/35 virus dramatically, and an Asn-to-Asp substitution at position 701 of PB2 plays a key role in this function. Conversely, of the recombinant viruses in the DKGX/22 background, only the 1 that contains the PB2 gene of DKGX/35 was able to replicate in mice. A single amino acid substitution (Asp to Asn) at position 701 of PB2 enabled DKGX/22 to infect and become lethal for mice. These results demonstrate that amino acid Asn701 of PB2 is one of the important determinants for this AIV to cross the host species barrier and infect mice, though the replication and lethality of H5N1 influenza viruses involve multiple genes and may result from a constellation of genes. These findings may help to explain the expansion of the host range and lethality of the H5N1 influenza viruses to humansref EU health ministers decided on Thu 20 Oct 2005 to extend a ban on poultry imports to Russia, and impose new measures that would keep the Asian bird flu
    threat under control. The only areas to which the ban on Russia will not apply are Kaliningrad and some regions on the border of Finland. Special permission will be needed to keep birds at markets and exhibitions, shows and cultural events, and member states have to present special programmes for keeping and vaccinating birds in zoos. Chicken and chicken fodder must also be kept beyond reach of wild birds.
    On Oct 26 2005 EU banned imports of captive live birds from third countries until 30 Nov 2005. Birds will be allowed to be moved between approved zoos and similar institutions. Hatching eggs of non-poultry birds can be imported for use in authorised hatcheries if their shells are decontaminated upon arrival, or if they are being sent to zoos. Concerning the movement of birds accompanying their owners, Member States can allow < 5 birds accompanying their owners to enter from third countries on condition that they have undergone a 30-day quarantine in approved third countries, otherwise they must be subject to 30 days quarantine in the Member State of destination. As an alternative to quarantine, such birds may be admitted if they have been vaccinated against avian influenza, or have tested negative for avian influenza during a 10 day isolation period before movement. The movement of birds accompanying their owners is not restricted for Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Andorra, Iceland, Greenland, Faeroe Islands and San Marinoref.
    European Commission. Guidelines for Member States enhanced surveillance for avian influenza viruses in wild birds in the European Union - September 2005 to January 2006. Press release MEMO/05/304, 7 Sep 2005 : Collaboration and coordination between veterinary authorities, epidemiologists, laboratory experts and ornithological institutions at EU level should be reinforced. The Commission and the Member States should explore all means to reach this goal, with special emphasis on bringing  together existing expertise in the relevant fields with the objective of establishing an EU surveillance network.
    All naturally occurring wild birds species in the EU, including the above listed species, fall under the protection regime of Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds and therefore full regard should be taken of the requirements of this Directive in any surveillance for Avian Influenzaref. Other birds that should be monitored include herons (any of various wading birds of the family Ardeidae, having a long neck, long legs, a long pointed bill, and usually white, gray, or bluish-gray plumage).
    There are 4 broad categories that might help in the consideration of spread (local or otherwise) among wild bird species. These are: These categories might well produce a more useful tool for considering infection in wild birds than by looking at the purely species or genus-level.
    Birds of prey have been reported several times for H5N1, including very recently in Germany and in Ivory Coast (a sparrowhawk), and there was a report of H5N2 in a hawk in Kuwait in 2005. One would only suspect they get infected by attacking sick birds, but it would be useful to know under what conditions such
    attacks happen in order to fill out the epidemiologic picture.
    Outbreaks of H5N1 in domestic poultry since December 2003 : Of the said countries, South Korea is the only one which eradicated the disease, therefore currently regarded as free of HPAI.
    Referenced reports of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 in wildlife and domestic animals by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) National Wildlife Health Center (NWHC)ref : the list includes presently 10 mammal and 88 avian species
    order
    species
    common name
    wild
    captive/sanctuary
    domestic pet
    experimental
    mortality
    bibliography
    Ciconiiformes Anastomus oscitans Asian open-billed stork + + ProMED 20041214.3303, Keawcharoen et al., 2005
    Ardea cinerea grey heron.
    Distribution: Ardea cinerea cinerea, mostly of Palearctic, thinly through Africa, India and Sri Lanka. A. c. jouyi [the sub-species found in Hong-kong?] Japan to N Burma and S to Java.
    Movements: Populations of extreme N migratory, further S tend to be sedentary or dispersive. In Palearctic, migratory tendency increases towards N and E; breeding populations of Iberian Peninsula, Britain and Ireland are sedentary, but others E to Siberia mainly migratory, though some individuals overwinter on breeding grounds; most migration towards  SW, more rarely towards S or SE, starting Sept/Oct, with return starting in Feb. Birds of Far East [A. c. jouyi] migrate to S China; 2 birds ringed in SE Siberia recovered in N Thailand; partial migrant in Japan
    + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Ardea herodias (?) great blue heron is a New World species that is not found in Europe. Unless the report refers to a captive individual in a collection (which seems unlikely), I suspect that the bird referred to in the report is a Grey Heron (Ardea cinerea), found across Europe, Asia (as far east as Japan and as far south as Indonesia) and Africa. The bird is resident through much of Europe, although northerly populations do migrate south during the winter. + + Romania, 2005 (ProMED 20051130.3460, 20051201.3463 (HPAI H5))
    Ardeola bacchus Chinese pond heron + + OIE 2005 Disease Information Vol. 18-no2
    Egretta garzetta little egret + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Phoenicopteriformes Phoenicopterus ruber greater flamingo + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Podicipediformes Podiceps cristatusref1, ref2 great crested grebe + + Lvov et al. In press. NCBI Sequence Viewer - Genbank entry DQ190857
    Bavaria, 2006
    Anseriformes Aix sponsa wood duck + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Amazonetta brasiliensis Brazillian teal + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Anas bahamensis Bahama pintail + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Anas castanea chestnut-breasted teal + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Anas platalea Argentine shoveller + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Anas platyrynchos domestic duck + + Guan et.al. 2002; Effects of HPAI in domestic ducks include a continuum ranging from subtle production effects (with moderately increased mortality rates and 
    respiratory signs), to severe and even fatal diseaseref1, ref2, ref3
    Anas sibilatrix Chiloe wigeon + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Anas strepera gadwall + - OIE Mission to Russia, 2005
    Anas versicolor puna teal + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Anser anser domesticus domestic goose + + + Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Webster et al., 2002
    Anser erythropus lesser white-fronted goose
    Distribution: Narrow bands across Arctic Eurasia.
    Movements: Migratory, main wintering areas on coastal plains of Caspian and Black Seas and in E China. Occasionally mixes with flocks of A. albifrons and occurs much further W than normal range; regular in Britain.
    Status and Conservation: ....Reckoned to be endangered in Europe: best wintering grounds seem to be on Pannoic Planis, Hungary, where species formerly vary abundant, but now amasses only a few thousand birds
    + + Romania, 2005 (ProMED 20051130.3460 (HPAI H5))
    Anser indicus bar-headed goose + + Chen et.al. 2005;
    and Liu et.al. 2005
    Aythya ferinaref1, ref2 common pochard + - OIE Mission to Russia, 2005
    Aythya fuligularef1, ref2, ref3, ref4 tufted duck + + ProMED 20060219.0541
    OIE report 16.3.2006
    Aythya marilaref greater scaup OIE report 16.3.2006
    Branta canadensisref Canada goose + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Branta ruficollisref1, ref2 red-breasted goose + + ref
    Callonetta leucophrys ringed teal + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Chenonetta jubata manned wood-duck + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Coscoroba coscoroba Coscoroba swan + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Cygnus atratus black swan + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Cygnus cygnusref1, ref2 whooper swan + + Promed 20050826.2527
    Cygnus melanocoryphus black-necked swan + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Cygnus olorref1, ref2 mute swan; 
    Distribution: British Is, C and N Europe through C Asia to E China.
    Feral populations in North America, Japan, South Africa, SW Australia and New Zealand.
    Movements: Truly wild populations mainly migratory, particularly where displaced by cold weather; spend winter in more temperate zones. European and feral populations mostly sedentary, males defending territory for most of year. Recorded as vagrant in Pakistan
    + + FAO/AIDE Update on Avian Influenza No. 35
    Romania 2005
    Dendrocygna viduata white-faced whistling-duck + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Mergus albellus smew/common merganser + + ProMED 20060222.0569
    Nesochen sandvicensi Hawaiian goose + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Netta peposaca Rosybill pochard duck + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Netta rufina red-crested pochard + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Tadorna ferruginea ruddy shelduck + + OIE 2005. Disease Information Vol.18-no.21
    Charadriformes Larus atricilla laughing gull + - Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Larus brunnicephalus brown-headed gull + + + Chen et.al. 2005;
    and Liu et.al. 2005
    Larus ichthyaetus great black-headed gull + + + Chen et.al. 2005;
    and Liu et.al. 2005
    Larus ridibundus black-headed gull + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Tringa ochropus green sandpiper + - OIE Mission to Russia 2005
    Falconiformes Accipiter gentilisref Northern goshawk + + OIE 2006. Disease Information vol19 no.8.
    Buteo buteoref1, ref2, ref3 common buzzard + + OIE 2006; ref
    OIE report 16.3.2006
    Falco cherrug saker falcon + + ProMEDMail 20060130.0299
    Falco peregrinus peregrine falcon + + + OIE 2004 Disease Information Vol.17-no.5; Hong Kong Final Report 7/30/03
    Ichthyophaga ichthyaetus grey-headed fish-eagle + + FAO AIDE report #16
    Spilornis cheela? serpent eagle + + FAO AIDE report #16
    Spizaetus nipalensis crested hawk-eagle + - van Borm et.al., 2005
    Strigiformes Bubo buboref
    Bubo nipalensis
    eagle owl 
    spot-bellied eagle-owl
    + + OIE report 16.3.2006
    FAO AIDE report #16
    Ketupa ketupu buffy fish-owl + + FAO AIDE report #16
    Ketupa zeylonensis brown fish-owl + + FAO AIDE report #16
    Strix uralensis spotted wood-owl + + FAO AIDE report #16
    Struthioniformes Dromaius novaehollandiae emu + - Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Perkins and Swayne, 2002
    Gruiformes Amauronis akool ? brown (red-legged) crake + + Xinhua News 1/11/06
    Fulica atraref coot + - OIE Mission to Russia 2005
    Gallinula chloropus common moorhen
    Distribution: Europe, North Africa, Azores, Canaries and Cape Verde Is E through W, C & S Asia to Japan, S to Sri Lanka and C Malaysia; N populations winter S to Mediterraneana region, sub-Saharan Africa and S. Asia.
    Movements: In W Palearctic, resident or dispersive in S and extreme W, partially migratory to migratory elsewhere, extent of movement increasing further to N & E. Almost wholly summer visitor to former USSR and Finland, while relatively few remain in N Scandinavia, N
    Germany and Poland in winter. N European birds winter S to Iberia, Italy, Balkans and N Africa. Autumn movements mainly SW from N Europe
    and S-SE from C Europe; main S movements Sept-Dec, juveniles dispersing from Jul; return passage Mar-May. Winter range of emigrant Russian birds, and extent of dispersal by Near East birds, unknown. Passage noted Azerbaijan Mar-Apr and Oct-Nov
    + + Romania 2005 (ProMED 20051130.3460 (HPAI H5))
    Porphyrio porphyrio sultan (purple swamphen) OIE 23 Feb 2006
    Galliformes Alectoris chukar Chukar partridge + + Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Colinus virginianus bobwhite quail + + Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Coturnix coturnix japonicus Japanese quail + + Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Gallus domesticus domestic chicken + + + Subbarao et.al. 1998
    Lophura leucomelanos Kalij pheasant + + Keawcharoen et al., 2005
    Meleagris gallopavo turkey + + Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Numida meleagris pearl guineafowl + + Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Pavo cristatus albus White Indian peafowl + + Keawcharoen et al., 2005.
    Phasianus colchicus ring-necked pheasant + + Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Pelecaniformes Phalacrocorax carbo great cormorant + + OIE 2005. Disease Information Vol.18-no.21
    Phalacrocorax niger little cormorant + ? ProMED 20041214.3303
    Passeriformes Acridotheres cristatellus Crested mynah + + ref
    Carpodacus mexicanus house finch + + Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Copsychus saularisref oriental magpie robin + + ref
    Corvus macrorhynchos jungle crow + + Mase et.al., 2005; Report of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Infection Route Elucidation Team, June 30, 2004.
    Corvus splendens house crow + + Keawcharoen et al., 2005
    Dicrurus macrocercus black drongo + ? ProMED 20041214.3303
    Gracula religiosa hill mynah + + ProMED 20051021.3075; 20051022.3085.
    Leiothrix lutea red-billed leiothrix + + ProMED 20051021.3075; 20051022.3085.
    Lonchura punctulata scaly-breasted munia  is patently a very attractive and hotogenic bird, 10-12 cms in size, normally found in India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines as well as China and Taiwan. If some 38 000 Munia of Chinese origin are imported into Hong Kong each year, some will be going into the international pet bird trade + ? ProMED 20041213.3303
    Oriolus chinensis chinensis black-naped oriole + + ProMED 20051021.3075; 20051022.3085.
    Passer domesticus house sparrow + + - Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Passer montanus Eurasian tree-sparrow + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Kou et al, 2005
    Melville and Shortridge : Migratory waterbirds and avian influenza in the East Asian-Australasian Flyway with particular reference to the 2003-2004 H5N1 outbreak. Proceedings of the Waterbirds Around the World Conference, Edinburgh, UK, 3-8 Apr 2004. Wetlands International
    Pica pica sericea Korean magpie + + Kwon et al. 2005
    Sturnus vulgaris European starling + - Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Taeniopygia guttata zebra finch + + Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Zosterops japonicus Japanese white-eye + + ref
    Columbiformes Columba livia feral pigeon + + + Ellis et.al. 2004
    Macropygia ruficeps? Little cuckoo dove ? ? GenBank
    Streptopelia tranquebarica red-collared dove + ? ProMED 20041214.3303
    Psittaciformes Melopsittacus undulatus budgerigar + + Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Mammalia Chrotogale owstoni Owston palm civet + + OIE Aug 27, 2005 Mongolia Follow-Up Report No. 3
    Felis catus (a.k.a. Felis domesticus) domestic cat/feral cat + + + + Some older studies, from 1970, 1972, and 1981, reported experimental infection of domestic cats under laboratory conditions : although infection occurred (virus was recovered from the respiratory tract), all of the cats remained healthy and none developed typical symptoms of influenza, including fever, nasal discharge, coughing, or sneezing (these findings are important, in that they strongly suggest that, should additional cats become infected with H5N1, they would not shed large quantities of the virus). 
    A paper published in the Chinese Journal of Veterinary Science in 2003ref reported the isolation of influenza A virus (though the subtype of the influenza A virus is not mentioned in the paper, phylogenetic analysis showed great similarity between the NP gene of A/Tiger/Harbin/2/2002 and A/duck anyang/AVL/1/2001(H5N1) and A/goose/Guangdong/1/96(H5N1)) from specimens taken from a tiger in 2002 that showed high fever, anorexia, and seizures and died; the isolate caused severe clinical signs and pathological changes (characterized similar to those of the tiger by pneumonia) and death in 2 out of 3 domestic cats experimentally infected with the virus by intravenous inoculation.
    Recent cases of clade I in cats from Austria, Germany, Thailand, Indonesia, and clade II in 2 dead domestic cats during a 2-week field trip in February 2006 near Erbil City, in Kurdish northern Iraqref1, ref2. The findings also suggest that cats might help provide an early-warning system for avian flu by acting as 'sentinels't. Many remote areas lack the veterinary infrastructure to test quickly for H5N1. So as a proxy, H5N1 should be immediately suspected and guarded against whenever unusual bird and cat die-offs happen together. Cats can carry the virus in their guts and faeces, and so could contaminate the environment to spread the virus. It's conceivable that cats could spread the virus, although they may be 'dead-end' hosts that die after receiving the disease without passing it on. There have been reports of cat die-offs in Indonesia in areas where no bird outbreaks have been reported, for example. And one cat virus has been shown to share gene sequences with human cases; gene sequences that have not been reported in poultry samples. Some human cases from Java have no obvious avian counterparts. Other carnivores are also likely to fall foul of flu : his group is now also looking at ferrets, foxes and seals. Sentinels are important as a first alert, but they are no substitute for detailed investigation
    Kuiken et.al. 2004
    Songserm et al 2006
    Macaca fascicularis cynomolgus macques + + - Kuiken et.al. 2004
    Mustela putoris furo ferret + + Govorkova et.al. 2004
    Martes foinaref stone marten + ref
    Oryctolagus cuniculus New Zealand white rabbit + - Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Panthera pardus

    Neofelis nebulosa

    leopard

    clouded leopard

    + + Thanawongnuwech et.al. 2005; and Keawcharoen et.al. 2004

    ref1, ref2

    Panthera tigris tiger + + Thanawongnuwech et.al. 2005; and Keawcharoen et.al. 2004
    Rattus norvegicus rat + - Perkins and Swayne, 2003
    Sus domesticus pig + + - Chen et.al. 2005
    Additional wild bird species presenting higher risk in relation to AI : The European Commission published on 18 Feb 2006 its Decision 2006/115/EC, concerning certain protection measures in relation to HPAI in wild birds in the Community. The decision, repealing previous decisions, was included in the Official Journal L 048 of 18 Feb 2006ref. Article 2 of the above decision deals with the Establishment of protection and surveillance zones, as follows: On 12 Apr 2006, the Commission published its decision 2006/277/EC of 7 Apr 2006 amending Decision 2006/115/EC concerning certain protection measures in relation to highly pathogenic avian influenza in wild birds in the Communitref. The amendment prescribes supplementary provisions notably on the movement of certain birds and of products from poultry and other birds originating in the zone affected by the disease in wild birds, the time-table of such restrictions, etc.
    The 1st regions that will be hit when migrating birds come back after the winter will be Stavropol, Rostov and Krasnodar, as well as the republics of Dagestan and Kalmykia. Shooted wild birds would be left for predators, crows, which frequent residential areas, so we would bring infected birds closer to us. Phylogenetic trees constructed from fragments of the HA gene (nucleotides 801-1113) and NA gene (nucleotides 605-937) show that Russian isolates of the year 2005 exhibit greatest sequence similarity with the A/Qinghai/05 H5N1 group of isolates. The HA gene homology was shown in the following isolatesref: The inclusion of the Crimean (Ukraine) isolate underlines the claim that the virus has been transported by wild birds.
    The total numbers of H5 outbreaks in poultry in 16 countries since the  start of the panzootic in Dec 2003 to Dec 2005 are shown in a graph on OIE web-siteref.
    The  number of outbreaks (1 Dec 2005 update) in countries which have also experienced cases in humans, are (in brackets, number of confirmed cases in humans): Cambodia 15 (4); China (PRC) 77 (3); Indonesia 216 (12); Thailand 1164 (21); Vietnam 2141 (93).
    On Oct 25 the EU food safety agency (EFSA) warned consumers to avoid raw eggs and to cook poultry thoroughlyref. But the safety of eggs had not been in the
    spotlight, because chickens die within 24 hours of becoming infected, too short a time window for them to produce eggs. But the question about whether eggs are safe has assumed urgency since healthy chickens carrying the virus were discovered in Indonesia recently. The birds do not fall sick and continue laying eggs even though they carry and shed the virus : the eggs of chickens which tested positive for the virus were infected on the surface of their shells, and not inside. Anyway WHO recommendations tell that in countries with outbreaks, eggs may contain virus both on the outside (shell) and inside (white and yolk). Eggs from areas with outbreaks should not be consumed raw or partially cooked. Raw eggs should not be used in foods that will not be treated by heat high enough to kill the virus (70°C). The safety of shell eggs and their handling have been widely discussed during earlier years in relation to Salmonella enteritidisref
    Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. H5N1 outbreaks in 2005 and major flyways of migratory birds. Situation on 30 Aug 2005ref. Confirmed since 1 Jan 2006ref
    Here is a brief chronology of the spread of Asian bird fluref : H5N1 clusters in humans : more than 1/3 of the human cases of H5N1 avian influenza that occurred over a 19-month period were clustered within families, suggesting the possibility that some family members caught the virus from others. 41 of 109 cases (38%) identified between January 2004 and July 2005 occurred in 15 families, with between 2 and 5 cases per family. Most human cases of avian flu are believed to have stemmed from exposure to sick poultry. The virus has not yet shown an ability to spread easily between people, which is seen as the key missing prerequisite for an H5N1 pandemic. Researchers previously identified one cluster, involving a young Thai girl and her mother and aunt in September 2004, as the probable result of person-to-person transmission. Too little information is available to conclude whether the virus spread from person to person in any of the other families. Family clusters don't necessarily mean the virus is spreading from person to person : they may simply mean that relatives were exposed to H5N1-infected poultry at the same time. However, in 3 family clusters, all in Viet Nam, the 1st and 2nd patients fell ill more than a week apart, which suggests that they probably didn't acquire the virus from the same source at the same time. Family clusters were slightly more common in the period from December 2004 through July 2005 than they were in the preceding year: 9 clusters in 243 days, or 3.7 per 100 days, versus 6 clusters in 365 days, or 1.6 per 100 days (RR = 2.3; IC95 = 0.8-6.3). The difference was similar when the researchers compared the period from December 2004 through July 2005 with the same 8-month period a year earlier. Although this increase was not significant, any cluster of cases is of great concern and should be promptly and thoroughly investigated because it might be the first indication of viral mutations resulting in more efficient person-to-person transmission. The researchers defined a family cluster as 2 or more family members with laboratory-confirmed H5N1avian flu or 2 or more family members with severe pneumonia or respiratory death, when at least one member had confirmed H5N1. Of the 41 patients in the 15 family clusters, 25 (61%) died. Another 4 patients recovered, while 3 were never sick even though they tested positive for the virus. The outcomes for the other 9 patients were unknown. Family clusters are still occurring, but they do not appear to be increasing as a proportion of total cases. There is a decline in the overall death rate for human cases: 32 of 44 cases (73%) from December 2003 through November 2004, versus 23 of 65 cases (35%) from December 2004 through July 2005. Family clusters can be and probably were the result of common exposures. If the exposure was environmental (contact with poultry excrement or diseased poultry in the household compound), then the timing of each exposure may have varied. The majority of these family clusters had dates of onset consistent with common exposures rather than successive generations of cases. The paucity of cases in health care workers seems to mitigate against person-to-person transmission as a main explanation for these clusters. One suspects there is the added artifact that there is now a higher index of suspicion leading to this epidemiologist's favorite maxim -- "seek and ye shall find"ref.
    Cluster
    Onset of index case
    Country
    Age (y)/Sex
    Relation to index case
    H5N1
    Onset
    Outcome
    1
    Dec 03
    Vietnam (N)
    12/F
    Self
    +
    Dec 25
    D
    30/F
    Mother
    +
    Jan 1
    D
    2
    Dec 03
    Vietnam (N)
    5/M
    Self
    +
    Dec 29†
    D
    7/F
    Sister
    NT
    NN
    D
    3
    Jan 04
    Vietnam (N)
    31/M
    Self
    NT
    Jan 7†
    D
    30/F
    Sister
    +
    Jan 10
    D
    28/F
    Wife
    +
    Jan 10
    R
    23/F
    Sister
    +
    Jan 11
    D
    4
    Jan 04
    Thailand
    6/M
    Self
    +
    Jan 8
    D
    33/F
    Mother
    NT
    Jan 8
    D
    5
    Jul 04
    Vietnam (S)
    19/M
    Self
    NT
    Jul 23
    D
    22/F
    Cousin
    NT
    NN
    D
    25/F
    Sister
    +
    Jul 31
    D
    6
    Sep 04
    Thailand
    11/F
    Self
    NT
    Sep 2
    D
    26/F
    Mother
    +
    Sep 11
    D
    32/F
    Aunt
    +
    Sep 16
    R
    7
    Dec 04
    Vietnam (N)
    46/M
    Self
    +
    Dec 26
    D
    42/M
    Brother
    +
    Jan 10†
    R
    36/M
    Brother
    +
    Not ill
    Not ill
    8
    Jan 05
    Vietnam (S)
    17/M
    Self
    +
    Jan 10†
    D
    22/F
    Sister
    NN
    NN
    Unknown‡
    9
    Jan 05
    Vietnam (S)
    35/F
    Self
    +
    Jan 14
    D
    13/F
    Daughter
    +
    Jan 20
    D
    10
    Jan 05
    Cambodia
    14/M
    Self
    NT
    NN
    D
    25/F
    Sister
    +
    Jan 21
    D
    11
    Feb 05
    Vietnam (N)
    21/M
    Self
    +
    Feb 14
    Unknown‡
    14/F
    Sister
    +
    Feb 23
    Unknown‡
    80/M
    Grandfather
    +
    Not ill
    Not ill
    12
    Feb 05
    Vietnam (N)
    69/M
    Self
    +
    Feb 19
    D
    61/F
    Wife
    +
    Not ill
    Not ill
    13
    Mar 05
    Vietnam
    13/F
    Self
    NT
    Mar 9§
    D
    5/M
    Brother
    +
    Mar 12†
    R
    Adult/F
    Aunt
    P
    NN
    Unknown‡
    14
    Mar 05
    Vietnam (N)
    39/M
    Self
    +
    Mar 22†
    Unknown‡
    Adult/F
    Wife
    +
    Mar 22†
    Unknown‡
    4 mo/NN
    Child
    +
    Mar 22†
    Unknown‡
    3/NN
    Child
    +
    Mar 22†
    Unknown‡
    10/NN
    Child
    +
    Mar 22†
    Unknown‡
    15
    Jul 05
    Indonesia
    8/F
    Self
    +¶
    Jun 24
    D
    1/F
    Sister
    NT
    Jun 29
    D
    38/M
    Father
    +
    Jul 2
    D
    *D, respiratory death; N, north; NT, not tested; NN, not noted; P, pending; R, recovered; S, south.
    †Date of hospitalization.
    ‡Had respiratory symptoms, was hospitalized (unknown for #13), and outcome was unknown.
    §Date of death.
    ¶Serologically confirmed; classified as a probable case by the World Health Organization.
    There has not been a single case of infection involving husband and wife [i.e. family members not related by blood], suggesting genetic susceptibilityref. A genetic predisposition for infection is suspected based on data from rare instances of human-to-human transmission in genetically-related persons : this possibility, if
    more fully explored, might help explain why human cases are comparatively rare and why the virus is not spreading easily from animals to humans or from human to humanref. Anyway a woman in any suspected cluster is likely to test positive as a result of exposure to infection as a consequence of her dual role in poultry rearing and food preparation and not exclusively as a consequence of genetic relationship
    Mallard ducks have been identified as the "champion" spreaders of bird flu, and appear to shed the virus increasingly from the respiratory tract rather than via faeces, the WHO said. This finding will require modifying disease surveillance strategies so that samples are also taken from birds' pharynx, as well as faeces; mute swans are highly susceptible birds that are thought to serve as sentinels, but probably not as vectors of virus transmission. The full WHO Report is published as Influenza research at the human and animal interface Report of a WHO working group Geneva, Switzerland, 21-22 Sep 2006, and can be accessed at WHO/CDS/EPR/GIP/2006.3ref
    New Jersey based WBB Securities LLC predicted a pandemic could cause a one-year economic loss of $488 billion and a permanent economic loss of $1.4 trillion to the US economy. The World Bank has predicted a pandemic could cost the global economy $800 billion a year. If the virus mutates into a form which passes between humans, it is likely to closely resemble the 1918 pandemic strain of flu that killed anywhere between 20 million and 100 million people, separate reports released by WBB and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) said. This means 30% of the population would be infected and > 2% would die. Further, CBO assumed that those who survived would miss 3 weeks of work, either because they were sick, because they feared the risk of infection at work, or because they needed to care of family or friends. The CBO said a pandemic could deal a $675 billion hit to the US economy.
    The EMEA pandemic influenza crisis management plan is currently out for consultationref : guidelines on the core dossierref1, ref2. A core summary of product characteristics for pandemic influenza vaccines was adopted in 2005ref : the EMEA review on influenza antiviral medicinal products for use in pandemicsref
    4 presentations were made by different experts during the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health (SCFCAH) working group meeting on 6 Sep 2005 (ref 1 includes maps on bird migration; refs 2 and 4 include collected virological data from wild birds): The International Reference Laboratory at VLA-Weybridge provides confirmatory testing services 7 days a week and has been doing so since the European outbreaks began. It is often the case that countries advise the media that they have sent samples to Weybridge, when in fact the shipment has not even been prepared.  It is of further concern that on occasion, information on when results may be expected is provided without consulting this office. Therefore I would be grateful if you could treat with caution any claims on when samples arrived/were tested at VLA-Weybridge without verification from themselves. During the 2nd week in Feb 2006, Western Europe reported its 1st cases of the highly pathogenic H5N1 strain of avian flu in wild birds. Across Italy, Greece and Slovenia, more than 25 mute swans died; by 14 Feb 2006, the virus had also been found in wild swans in Austria and Germany. Conservationists, poultry keepers and health officials are bracing themselves for more widespread outbreaks. There are now calls for drastic measures against wild bird populations. I believe these measures would put some species at risk of extinction, without having any effect on the spread of avian flu. The likelihood is that the swans now dying in Western Europe had recently arrived from the Black Sea, driven south and west by freezing conditions that prevented them feeding. They may have caught the disease from other wild birds; but this is unlikely given the tens of thousands of waterfowl that have tested negative for H5N1 over the last decade. Much more likely is that before starting out, they picked up the virus from farms, either from infected poultry or their faeces. Mute swans often graze agricultural fields, and are likely to have come into contact with poultry manure spread as a fertiliser. If wild birds had been spreading the disease across continents there would have been trails of outbreaks following migration routes; but this hasn't happened. The "wild bird" theory for the spread of H5N1 also provides no explanation as to why certain countries on flight paths of birds from Asia remain flu-free, whilst their neighbours suffer repeated infections. What is striking is that countries like Japan and South Korea, which imposed strict controls on the import and movement of domestic poultry after initial outbreaks, have suffered no further infections. Myanmar has never reported an outbreak. In fact, countries which have not yet developed a large-scale intensive poultry industry have also been largely spared. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reports that in Laos, 42 out of 45 outbreaks affected intensive poultry units. Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses are very rare in wild birds. But in intensively farmed poultry, the high density of birds and constant exposure to faeces, saliva and other secretions provide ideal conditions for the replication, mutation, recombination and selection through which highly lethal forms can evolve. Add to this repeated misdiagnosis, industry and government cover-ups, and panic selling or processing of potentially infected birds, and we have the explanation for why H5N1 is now endemic in parts of South-East Asia. Factor in the global nature of the poultry industry, and the international movement of live poultry and poultry products both before and after the Asian outbreaks, and we have the most plausible mechanism for the spread of the virus between places which are not connected by the flyways of migratory birds. The timing and pattern of outbreaks has been largely inconsistent with wild bird movements; but they have often followed major trade routes. The view that poultry movements have played a major role in the spread of the disease is supported by an analysis of viral strains recently published in the US journal PNAS. Some of the agencies attempting to monitor and control avian flu, such as FAO, seem to have been reluctant to draw attention to the role of intensive agriculture, because of the impact on national economies and on access to cheap sources of protein. For this and other reasons, the role of migratory wild birds in the transmission of the disease has been exaggerated, and further sensationalised in the press. In some countries there has been a backlash against bird conservation, leading to calls for the culling of whole populations, draining of wetlands and destruction of nesting sites. In fact, H5N1 outbreaks in wild birds have so far mostly burned themselves out without culls or other human interventions. Some of the world's most threatened birds may be put at risk. But there is also the near-certainty of damage to ecosystem services on which people and economies depend. Alarmingly for those who fear a human bird flu epidemic, such a distorted picture also means that the right questions are not being asked, and the most effective protection measures may not be undertaken. BirdLife International is calling for an independent inquiry into the spread of H5N1 which gives due weight to the role of the global poultry industry, and maps both official and unofficial poultry trade routes against the pattern of outbreaks. It may also be time to take a long, hard look at the way the world feeds itself, and to decide whether the price paid for modern farming in terms of risks to human health and the Earth's biodiversity is too highref.
    A number of misconceptions about avian influenza need to be challenged before they become further entrenched in the minds of the public and policy makers : How to carry out a field epidemiology investigation, full of his experiences. Given limited facilities and time, he told us that you should ignore the body of an epidemic and investigate the outliers because how these occurred would provide the most insight. Later this was defined by David Roger's 'Two Models' Rule: A mathematical model to describe the core area of an epidemic will need some 20 parameters but for the margin you will only need 3 parameters. This is logical because at the margins the disease is either present or it isn't; in the centre the incidence is going up and down all over the place. This is what we are seeing with H5N1 avian influenza; what is or is not happening in central China may only be confusing the interpretation of long-distance spread. The interpretation of simple prevalence studies of market animals should be conservative, as the true events can be complex. This is clearly an instance in which forensic molecular studies of the virus isolates from inside and outside China would be invaluable. The results quoted for PNAS above need to be rigorously confirmed by others, and it should involve, if possible, purposefully collected samples, not opportunist diagnostic laboratory survivors. It is now mid-February and the migratory birds over-wintering in the Southern Hemisphere will be heading north, back to their breeding grounds. A commercial poultry breeding facility in Lanzhou, China, was identified by FAO as the probable source for a H5N1 outbreak in Tibet in 2005. The parent company of one major breeding facility in Lanzhou -- according to information on its corporate website -- also controls 30-40% of the commercial poultry industry in Turkey. The problem is not just identifying the risks for long-distance spread but quantifying them so that they can be prioritised, and appropriate actions taken in the most cost-effective manner and sequence. At the same time, farm biosecurity and appropriate flock disease prevention/vaccination needs to be implemented. The former is a national/international responsibility; the latter is local. This provides a wealth of images of Thai situations including poultry markets, plus Dhanin Chearavanont, Chairman and CEO of Charoen Pokphand Group (Thailand), inspecting one of his fighting cocks at his Native Chicken Research and Development Center. In Thailand a special breed of chicken is raised for cock fighting, and these birds can reach prices of Baht 150 000 (US $3850) and more. One might assume that these beautiful birds are sold with a health certificateref. In September 2004, Cambodian authorities noted that the source of a bird flu outbreak was chicks supplied by the Thai company, Charoen Pokphand. This company dominates the feed industry and is the biggest supplier of chicks to China, Indonesia, Viet Nam and Turkey, which have witnessed bird flu outbreaks. Charoen Pokphand (India) claims that their flocks are healthyref1, ref2. Vertical integration was highly developed at Charoen Pokphand; reportedly, nothing went to waste at the group companies. For instance, the protein-rich chicken feathers were recycled to make chicken feed; the innards of the chickens were recycled into fish feed; and the carcasses of
    chickens were fed to crocodiles on the group's crocodile farmsref. There is a useful review of this controversy in today's UK Guardian by Joanna Blythmanref1, ref2
    Links to the data of the following 21 recently sequenced HA genes from H5N1 isolates are currently available at OFFLU's website, as updated 5 Jul 2006: Prevention : Web resources :
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